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LITIGATING ON A CONTINGENCY: A MONOPOLY OF
CHAMPIONS OR A MARKET FOR CHAMPERTY?
RICHARD W. PAINTER*
Two of the most divisive issues in current debate over civil litiga-
tion are whether there should be limitations on lawyers' contingent
fees and whether losing parties should be required to pay winners'
legal expenses. Proponents of litigation reform urge both measures,1
but opponents argue that some "reforms" would be unfair to plaintiffs
and would make litigation unaffordable for most people. 2 However,
both debates hinge on a broader issue: how and when lawyers should
share the risks of litigation. This Article examines the economic and
ethical implications of such risk sharing by lawyers and their clients.
In particular, this Article discusses whether the market for risk sharing
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. B.A., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1984; J.D., Yale University, 1987. I would like to thank Lester Brickman, Chuck
O'Kelley, Harold Krent, and Jennifer Duggan for helpful comments on prior drafts of this
Article.
1. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(c) (West Supp. 1996)
(requiring mandatory review by the court for attorney compliance with Rule 11(b) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, mandatory sanctions for violation of Rule 11(b), and a presump-
tion in favor of attorneys' fees and costs as the sanction for failure to comply with Rule 11(b))
[hereinafter SLRA]. An earlier draft of the SLRA had gone even further in seeking to impose
attorneys' fees as a sanction for unmeritorious suits. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 20B(c) (1995) (stating that a court shall award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party if "(A)
the position of the losing party was not substantially justified, (B) imposing fees and expenses on
the losing party or the losing party's attorney would be just, and (C) the cost of such fees and
expenses to the prevailing party is substantially burdensome or unjust"). The SLRA requires
that attorneys' fees be a "reasonable percentage of the amount of any damages and prejudgment
interest actually paid to the class," 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1(a)(6) (West Supp. 1996), and that any
proposed settlement agreement disseminated to a class of shareholders shall state the attorneys'
fees applied for, including calculation of those fees on a per share basis and a brief explanation
of the basis for the application. Id. § 77z-l(a)(7). Similar provisions were included in a bill in
the House of Representatives, covering diversity suits and suits over products liability. See H.R.
10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995). A proposal to require losing plaintiffs to pay defendants'
legal expenses in securities lawsuits was defeated in the California March 26, 1996, primary elec-
tion. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Cougars and Lawyers Come out Ahead in Propositions on
California Ballot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1996, at All. For discussion of proposals to limit law-
yers' contingent fees, see infra text accompanying notes 17-20.
2. Injustice for Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A20 (editorial). "The so-called
British rule of 'loser pays' is alien to the American system of accessible justice. House Republi-
cans seek nothing less than a crippling of the system of contingent fee arrangements that allow
plaintiffs without great riches to retain good lawyers, who charge nothing if they lose and a share
of the winnings if they win." Id. "The lesson is clear: A plaintiff of modest income would face
far worse odds against a rich defendant under the British rule." Anthony Lewis & Charles Pe-
ters, Tort and Retort: Should We Make Litigants Pay for the Cost of the Court Cases They Lose?,
WASH. MONTHLY, May 1993, at 9.
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by lawyers is competitive and whether there are feasible alternatives
to that market, such as insuring litigation costs with third parties.
Charging on a contingency is most prevalent in the personal in-
jury arena,3 but has spread to antitrust litigation, 4 shareholder deriva-
tive suits,5 patent litigation,6 mergtrs and acquisitions, 7 securities
litigation,8 and even lobbying.9 This practice remains unique to the
3. Ninety-five percent of personal injury cases are taken on a contingency. Note, Settling
for Less: Applying Law and Economics to Poor People, 107 HARV. L. REV. 442, 448 n.23 (1993)
(citing JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT
LITIGATION 37 (1986)). Although contingent fees traditionally are charged by plaintiffs' lawyers,
defense lawyers occasionally charge "reverse contingent fees," which are an agreed upon per-
centage of the amount the client saves. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality
of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification and Organization of Lawyering, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621, 655 n.163 (1994) (discussing Aetna Insurance Company's policy of
requesting "blended" value-billing from its lawyers, including a contingent fee with "reverse
bonus for low settlement rates in defense work"). The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility has concluded that in civil cases as long as the fee arrangement real-
istically estimates the risk involved in a case, the fee is consistent with the Model Rules. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 373 (1993).
4. See Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1971).
5. In derivative suits, as in securities class actions, attorneys' fees are actually paid under
the "common fund" doctrine that allows a named plaintiff who creates a fund for the benefit of
other injured investors to recover attorneys' fees from the fund. See George D. Hornstein, The
Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 786 (1939). Judge Ralph
K. Winter observes that "[t]he real incentive to bring derivative actions is usually not the hope of
return to the corporation but the hope of handsome fees to be recovered by plaintiffs' counsel."
Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
6. See Andrea Gerlin, Patent Lawyers Forgo Sure Fees on a Bet, WALL ST. J., June 24,
1994, at BI. Patent lawyer Gerald Hosier of Aspen, Colorado, used contingent-fee agreements
and then settled many claims "by striking licensing deals valued at about $450 million with al-
leged infringers. [His] contingency-fee agreement ... entitled him to a portion of the proceeds.
In 1992, he earned an estimated $150 million." Id.
7. Daniel Hertzberg & James B. Stewart, Contingency Legal Fee for Merger Breaks
Ground, Stirs Controversy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 1986, at 31 (discussing "performance fee"
charged by Wachtell Lipton and Skadden Arps). However, the vast majority of corporate work
is billed at an hourly rate, a practice that gives rise to its own ethical issues. See William G. Ross,
The Ethics of Hourly Billing by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1991); George D. Hornstein,
Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REV. 658 (1956).
8. Contingent fees are commonplace in class action securities cases under § 11 of the 1933
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994), and § 10 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1994), although some courts require lawyers to bid against each other for the work. See In
re Oracle Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 688, 697 (N.D. Cal.), 132 F.R.D. 538, 539, 542 (N.D. Cal. 1990),
136 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (outlining Judge Walker's imposition of bidding procedures
on lawyers' seeking to become lead counsel in action brought against accountants). But see In re
Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1378-79 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (making judge-devised, bench-
mark percentage-fee suggestions); Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272
(9th Cir. 1989) (same). An intriguing fee arrangement was proposed when investors in Madison
Plaza Associates, a limited partnership, made claims on a $330 million compensation fund set up
by Prudential Securities to settle federal regulators' fraud allegations in connection with sale of
the limited partnership interests. Baker & McKenzie, which also represented the general part-
ner of Madison, agreed to represent the investors making claims against the Prudential fund for
a contingent fee, but also insisted that part of any recovery be reinvested in Madison and "at
least ten percent... be turned over to Madison's... general partner." Kurt Eichenwald, Baker
Firm Withdraws Counsel Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at D3 [hereinafter Baker Firm]; Kurt
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United States; most other jurisdictions, including England and Scot-
land, prohibit contingent fees in many circumstances. 10
A substantial body of academic literature discusses whether con-
tingent fees are ethical and the effect such fees have on both settle-
ment discussions and litigation. Critics argue that contingent fees
encourage litigation, inflate jury verdicts, overcompensate lawyers,
and encourage unethical practices." Lawyers working for contingent
fees also may have incentives to pressure clients for quick settlements
in order to collect a fee and move on to other cases.12 Proponents
Eichenwald, Law Firm's Offer Perplexes Prudential Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1994, at D2
[hereinafter Law Firm's Offer]. After serious ethical concerns were raised about the proposed
arrangement, Baker's offer was withdrawn. Baker Firm, supra; Law Firm's Offer, supra.
9. T.R. Goldman, Contingent-Fee Lobbying Draws Fire, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at 1;
see Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 64 (1945) (noting that "[c]ontingent fee contracts to
secure Government business for the employer of the recipient" are "generally held invalid as
against public policy").
10. See MARY A. GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 54 (1994); infra text accompany-
ing notes 61-66. "But the countries that have outlawed contingent fees generally address their
citizens' legal needs by regulating legal fees, or by providing broad-based legal assistance, com-
prehensive social insurance, or some combination thereof." GLENDON, supra, at 54. Further-
more, growing political sentiment to encourage lawyers to undertake litigation without recourse
to legal aid funds is leading to expansion of allowed contingency arrangements in some coun-
tries. For example, Scotland's Law Reform Act of 1990 (Miscellaneous Provisions), § 36 creates
§ 61A of the Solicitors Act of 1980, which allows a solicitor and her client to agree that if litiga-
tion is successful the "solicitor's fee will be increased by a percentage" that "shall not exceed
limit[s]" set forth in the Act of Sederunt, SI 1992/1879 (for the sheriff court) and SI 1992/1898
(Rule of Court 350A for the Court of Session) (circumstances under which a solicitor's fee may
be increased, although by not more than 100%). Walter G. Semple, Fees in Speculative Actions,
J.L. Soc'Y SCOTLAND, Feb. 1994, at 57, 57.
In 1990, Parliament authorized "conditional fee agreements" in certain "specified proceed-
ings" to be designated by order of the Lord Chancellor. Courts and Legal Services Act, (1990)
(c 41), § 58(3) & (4). The Lord Chancellor is also to "prescribe the maximum permitted percent-
age [above the lawyer's usual fee] for each description of specified proceedings." Id. § 58(5).
On July 4, 1995, the Lord Chancellor "signed the statutory instruments which will bring into
force s.58 of the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990, allowing lawyers to act on a conditional
fee basis in personal injury cases, insolvency actions, and cases before the European Court of
Human Rights." Lord Mackay, Reducing Risks for Clients-The Introduction of the Conditional
Fee Scheme in England and Wales Should Benefit Clients and Widen Access to Justice, LAW Soci-
ETY's GAZET-E, July 5, 1995, at 10. The Lord Chancellor set the maximum "'uplift" (amount by
which a lawyer could increase his fee in a conditional fee case) at 100% and observed that
[tihe scheme will not operate in the same way as the contingency fee system of the
USA. There, subject to certain conditions, lawyers are entitled to receive a percentage
of any damages awarded to the client. The higher the award of damages, subject to
these conditions, the higher the lawyer's fee. It is easy to see that there is an inherent
conflict of interests in such a system. However, under the conditional fee scheme, the
final award will relate to the actual work carried out by the lawyer. This has been
allowed in Scotland for a long time.
Id. The Lord Chancellor noted that "[t]he uplift in any particular case should be related to a
realistic estimate of the chances of success in that case." Id.
11. Stewart Jay, The Dilemmas of Attorney Contingent Fees, 2 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 813,
813 (1989).
12. Forty-six of the victims of the 1989 chemical explosion at a Phillips Petroleum plant in
Houston have challenged the settlement of their lawsuits against Phillips, alleging that their own
lawyers from Umphrey, Burrow, Reaud, Williams & Bailey sold out client interests in order to
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instead argue that contingent fees assure that plaintiffs who cannot
afford lawyers have access to the courts. 13 Contingent fees may also
give lawyers incentives to work more diligently for their clients.' 4
Many commentators believe that, while contingent fees should be per-
mitted, they can easily become excessive.' 5 It is difficult, however, to
determine when contingent fees are excessive and when they are
not.1
6
Some reform proponents suggest capping allegedly excessive con-
tingent fees. Most notably, Lester Brickman, Michael Horowitz, and
Jeffrey O'Connell propose that, when a defendant makes an early set-
tlement offer that is subsequently rejected by a plaintiff, the plaintiff's
lawyer should be permitted to charge only an hourly rate on work
done before the settlement offer plus a percentage of any recovery in
excess of the offer (hereinafter referred to as the Brickman Propo-
sal). 17 The Brickman Proposal is supported by several prominent
members of the bench and bar,18 but has drawn predictably sharp crit-
obtain a quick settlement and their legal fees. The lawyers, who received a contingent fee of $65
million, allegedly negotiated for the plaintiffs as a group instead of individually and pressured
individual plaintiffs to accept settlement. Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion-Dollar Settle-
ment Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6. For further discussion of
contingent-fee lawyers' incentives and the extent such incentives may diverge from the interests
of their clients, see infra text accompanying notes 208-22.
13. PATRICIA M. DANZON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION 39
(1980); Jay, supra note 11, at 813.
14. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389, at 12
(1994); see also infra text accompanying note 202.
15. Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees without Contingencies: Hamlet without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 127 (1989) [hereinafter Brickman, Contingent Fees]; Grant P.
DuBois, Modify the Contingent Fee System, 71 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1985, at 38 ("During the last 20
years, the personal injury trial has become a personal road to riches for the plaintiffs attor-
ney."); see John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1653 (1974).
16. See Doyle C. Valley, Timing Payments of Attorney's Fees in Structured Settlements:
Avoiding Problems with the "When Received" Approach, 24 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 993, 995
(1988) (three general approaches used by the courts to determine the measure and time for the
payment of contingent attorney fees: present value of award, cost of settlement, and percentage
of payments when received); Richard G. Halpern, Structured Settlements, in ART OF ADVOCACY
SETTLEMENT 10-1 (Henry G. Miller ed., 1987).
17. LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 28 (1994).
18. Ninth Circuit Judge John T. Noonan, Jr., and Derek Bok, former President of Harvard
University, wrote a Foreword and Preface respectively for the Brickman Proposal. Id at 3.
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icism from the plaintiffs' bar19 and has even gained a mixed reception
from the insurance industry and other likely defendants. 20
Furthermore, the debate over contingent fees could be shaped by
the outcome of the debate over whether to adopt the English rule,
which requires the loser to pay both parties' fees as costs of suit,21 in
place of the American rule, which requires each party to bear its own
legal expenses, regardless of who wins.22 The English rule has re-
ceived substantial attention in academic literature, including several
articles in this Symposium 23 and has recently been embraced by a sig-
19. "The [Brickman Proposal's] effort to revamp the legal profession's contingency-fee
structure ... is another effort to sell Americans on the notion that lawyers who represent injured
consumers all have their briefcases lined with gold.
The contingent fee-or payment based on a percentage of the award of settlement-is truly
an American's key to the courthouse door." Stephan H. Peskin, Lobby for Insurers, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 1994, at A28 (letter to the editor from the President of the New York State Trial Law-
yers Association). A proposal similar to the Brickman Proposal limiting contingent fees was
narrowly defeated in the California March 26, 1996, primary election. Ayres, supra note 1, at
All.
20. Aetna, one of the largest property casualty insurers in the United States, believes
that any abuses of the contingency fee system are best addressed through marketplace
solutions (full disclosure to potential clients of the hours likely to be spent on the case,
probability of success, probable recovery and alternative fee arrangements) and, when
necessary, reduction of excessive fees by the courts. We do not support regulating fees.
Judyth W. Pendell, Fees in the Marketplace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1994, at A30 (letter to the editor
from the Vice President of Law and Regulatory Affairs, Aetna, Hartford). Although it is con-
ceivable that lower contingent fees, if made known to jurors and judges, could lead to lower
overall judgments against insured parties, insurance companies are unlikely to benefit therefrom
unless the market for insurance itself is uncompetitive. In a competitive market, insurance com-
panies would be forced to lower their premiums to account for lower payments on behalf of their
insureds. Indeed, insurers in a competitive market are most likely to be concerned not about the
level of damage awards, but whether insurance premiums can be accurately assessed because
such awards are predictable. Unpredictable aspects of the tort system such as punitive damages
are thus more likely to be opposed by the insurance industry than a fee system that allows
plaintiffs' lawyers to take a portion, usually one-third to one-half, of each judgment for
themselves.
21. See Injustice for Consumers, supra note 2. The English system is actually more compli-
cated than simply assessing losing parties with costs and leaves some discretion to the court both
in determining the amount of costs and determining who pays. Nonetheless, the usual English
rule is that the "loser pays." John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1568-71 (1993) (citing Tim Cornwall,
"Double or Quits": Quayle Likes the "English Rule" But Brits Have Their Doubts, LEGAL TIMES,
Feb. 10, 1992, at 1).
22. American courts' refusal to include attorneys' fees in judgments for costs is based on
concern that penalizing plaintiffs for losing decreases access to the courts. See Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247-71 (1975) (discussing case law and underlying
rationale for the American rule). But see Dawson, supra note 15, at 1598. "No adequate histori-
cal explanation for the [American] departure has ever been advanced, and in any event, the
reasons commonly given-the spirit of individualism in frontier societies, the conception in ear-
lier times of lawsuits as sporting contests, and the widespread hostility toward lawyers-are not
persuasive now." Id.
23. Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CH.-KENT L. REV. 427
(1995); Mark S. Stein, The English Rule with Client-to-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative Ap-
praisal, 71 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 603 (1995); Eric Talley, Liability-Based Fee-Shifting Rules and
Settlement Mechanisms Under Incomplete Information, 71 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 461 (1995). For
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
nificant number of legislators, particularly in connection with the Re-
publican Party's Contract With America.24 Although legislative
agendas have so far focused on the English rule,25 regulation of con-
tingent fees might be a politically more acceptable measure because it
is aimed, at least on its face, at plaintiffs' lawyers rather than at plain-
tiffs themselves. If the English rule fails in the legislative process, a
second wave of litigation reform proposals could center around the
Brickman Proposal and others like it.
If, on the other hand, an English rule were to be adopted, cus-
tomary contingent-fee arrangements might actually be expanded as
plaintiffs ask lawyers not only to work on a contingency, but also to
assume potential liability for paying opponents' counsel.26 In ex-
change, the agreed upon percentage of a judgment going to the lawyer
might be higher than if English-rule liability were not factored into the
criticism of the English rule, see Loser-Pays Attorney Fee Liability in Diversity Cases: Hearings
on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Professor) [hereinaf-
ter Rowe, Statement]; The Reality of the English Rule: Hearings on H.R. 10 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (statement of Herbert Kritzer, Professor) (English rule would be unfair to many liti-
gants); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 679 ("[A]t least on the range of considerations surveyed ... the case for
English-style general indemnity has appeared surprisingly weak and the argument for primarily
one-way pro-prevailing-plaintiff fee shifting surprisingly strong.") [hereinafter Rowe, Legal The-
ory]. For arguments in favor of the English rule, see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792, 799 (1966) (attorneys' fees awarded to
"the prevailing party [should be] 'graduated in part by necessary labor performed, and in part by
the amount in controversy"') (quoting COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, FIRST
REPORT 207 (1848)); Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 872 (1929) (award of sub-
stantial costs to successful parties as a means of reducing "unfair and unnecessary litigation"
should be considered in this country); Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of
Litigation?, 49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1964) (proposing that American jurisdictions follow the Eng-
lish rule); Gregory E. Maggs & Michael D. Weiss, Progress on Attorney's Fees: Expanding the
"Loser Pays" Rule in Texas, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1915, 1923, 1927 (1994) (suggesting further experi-
mentation with English rule in selected settings); William B. Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in
Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202, 218 (1966) (arguing that "[t]he failure
of American courts to allow a general recovery of attorney fees is an anachronism that should
not be continued").
24. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 145-47 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schel-
Ihas eds., 1994) (proposing English fee-shifting rule and caps on damages in product liability
cases).
25. See Injustice for Consumers, supra note 2.
26. Such an arrangement may be prohibited under the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibits a lawyer from providing "financial assistance to a client in con-
nection with pending or contemplated litigation" other than an advance of court costs and litiga-
tion expenses. Rule 1.8(e)(1) (1995). Although liability for opposing counsel's fees could
possibly be described as an "expense of litigation," this rule, and several others, would have to
be revised to facilitate lawyer-client arrangements designed to insure against English-rule liabil-
ity. See infra text accompanying notes 285-87.
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contingency. 27 This Article explores whether lawyers would be pre-
pared to share this risk for a reasonable charge. If so, a competitive
market for contingent fees could allow plaintiffs to insure against lia-
bility for opponents' fees under an English rule.
Another issue that this Article addresses is whether lawyers
should dominate the market for risk sharing in lawsuits, which is es-
sentially a market for champerty by lawyers. Champerty-paying for
a lawsuit in return for a portion of the proceeds-at common law was
barred to lawyers and lay persons alike.2 8 However, lawyers in the
United States take cases on a contingency,29 while common law still
restricts champerty by persons other than lawyers.30 Third parties
thus rarely offer to share the risks of litigation by agreeing to pay
plaintiffs' expenses. These restrictions on nonlawyer entrants into the
market for champerty increase lawyers' market power 31 and may re-
sult in higher fees for clients. The authors of the Brickman Proposal
perceive just such noncompetitive pricing 32 and suggest restrictions on
what they believe to be lawyers' abuse of market power. 33
The Brickman Proposal, however, does not address whether law-
yers' almost exclusive domination of the market for champerty is eco-
27. A contingent fee in the English system would be of limited use if it did not also account
for opposing counsel's costs. "[I]f contingency fees were to be allowed here, it would either be
necessary for the plaintiff to risk having to bear the defendant's costs, while escaping his own, or
for his lawyer to undertake that in the event of failure he would not only forgo his own fee but
would also pay the costs of the successful defendant." 1 THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON LEGAL
SERVICES, FINAL REPORT 177 (1979) [hereinafter ROYAL COMMISSION]. One rationale the
Commission advanced for opposing contingent fees was that the lawyer would charge too much
for such a contingency: "[t]o guard against [liability under the English rule], he would wish for a
contingent fee amounting to a large proportion of the damages, giving an excessively high re-
ward if the claim succeeded." Id. However, such a high surcharge might not be justified, be-
cause contingent-fee lawyers under an English-style fee-shifting rule would recover higher
amounts if successful (legal fees from opponents as well as a percentage of damages from cli-
ents). For lawyers who are successful at least half of the time, payments and receipts of attor-
neys' fees should balance out. See infra text accompanying note 319.
28. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETrncs 490 (1986); see Max Radin, Mainte-
nance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48,65-69 (1936); see also Arthur L. Kraut, Contingent Fee:
Champerty or Champion?, CLEV. ST. L. REV., May 1972, at 15, 16 (Despite the nonexistence of
Ohio statutes prohibiting champertous agreements, "it was established ... that [such agree-
ments] would not be enforced by the Ohio courts.").
29. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103 (1983) (allowing con-
tingent fees) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.5(c) & (d) (1995) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; WOLFRAM, supra note 28, at 490.
30. See Gardner v. Surnamer, 608 F. Supp. 1385, 1387 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (champerty alleged in
sale of claim under § 10-b of the Securities Exchange Act); WOLFRAM, supra note 28, at 490;
infra text accompanying notes 61-89.
31. See infra text accompanying note 100.
32. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 13-14.
33. The market power of plaintiffs' lawyers and its affect on pricing are discussed more fully
in Part III of this Article.
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nomically necessary or even desirable. Put another way, the question
remains whether lawyers are more efficient providers of champerty
than other persons would be and are therefore likely to provide clients
with the best terms. If the answer to this question is "no" or "not
always," then perhaps the market should be opened to other partici-
pants. Although regulation can be a useful way to combat abuse of
market power, so is injecting more competition into the marketplace.
This Article discusses circumstances in which nonlawyer investors
might share the risks of litigation on better terms than plaintiffs'
lawyers.
Although plaintiffs' legal-cost insurance is already available in
several countries in return for periodic premiums,34 this Article fo-
cuses on legal-cost insurance that could be purchased after a claim
arises in return for a portion of any judgment.35 In a less restricted
market for champerty, nonlawyer litigation insurers could offer to pay
a plaintiff's legal fees and other expenses in advance (and even as-
sume her potential liability under an English rule) while accepting in
return a sum to be paid out of any recovery. Lawyers and litigation
insurers are already experimenting with such arrangements for cases
34. Alternative methods of paying for litigation have proliferated in Great Britain, where
lawyers largely cannot charge contingent fees. Legal-cost insurance of various types is used to
cover approximately 2% of cases, approximately 28% of plaintiffs receive legal aid, and about
29% of accident cases are paid for by trade unions that retain lawyers for their members. Other
plaintiffs apparently self-insure or simply do not pay the other party's legal expenses if they lose.
See Kritzer, Statement, supra note 23, at 3. Legal-cost insurance schemes also are prevalent in
Germany, where insurers are sometimes blamed for litigiousness. See Alan Cowell, In Battle of
Beer Garden, Bavaria Bares Its Soul, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995, at A4 (beer garden owner sued
by neighbors objecting to noisy patrons; defendant and his patrons blame insurance companies
that offer policies covering the costs of litigation). German industry groups, like their American
counterparts, complain of growing litigiousness. "There are people in Bavarian villages who've
started court proceedings because cocks crowed too loud, cow bells were too noisy and church
bells rang too early for them." Id. (quoting Ursula Seebock, President of Germany's Association
to Promote the Culture of Beer Gardens).
35. The Royal Commission's Report on Legal Services observes that "insurance companies
have begun offering legal-cost insurance to individuals as well as to companies, in addition to the
more traditional insurance cover for personal injury and damage to property." ROYAL COMMIS-
SION, supra note 27, at 179. The Commission concludes that, although such insurance should not
be funded out of public funds, it may "prove a useful supplement to legal aid in some cases." Id.
Legal-cost insurance schemes have proliferated in England since the Lord Chancellor on July 4,
1995, signed statutory instruments to allow "conditional fee agreements" under § 58 of the
Courts and Legal Services Act 1990. See Conquest Sets up Rival P1 Helpline, LAWYER, Jan. 9,
1996, at 3 (describing scheme offered by the Litigation Protection Insurance Company that "will
cost clients £175, plus tax, for a minimum £25,000 cover" of litigation expenses). To assist law
firms representing clients in conditional fee agreements, Johnson & Higgins and Lexington In-
surance Company of New York "will offer an insurance policy to 1,350 law firms that handle
personal injury cases and belong to Accident Line, a division of the Law Society." Sarah God-
dard, U.K. Law on Legal Fees Will Spur Injury Suits; Could Also Encourage Settlements, Bus.
INs., Aug. 14, 1995, at 35. These insurance policies cover "expenses awarded against the plaintiff
if they lose." Id.
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on appeal3 6 and are not doing so merely to engage in speculation. If
this legal-cost insurance market were extended to cases before trial,
insurers would evaluate potential claims and set "legal-cost insurance
premiums" either in fixed amounts (e.g., the first $100,000 of any judg-
ment) or in percentages (e.g., 20% of any judgment).37 Insurers
would hold diversified portfolios of legal-cost insurance contracts, 38
and plaintiffs could shop for the best terms either by negotiating di-
rectly with litigation insurers or by consulting litigation agents who,
like insurance agents, could inquire about facts of potential suits, in-
cluding plaintiffs' choice of counsel, and then obtain insurance quotes
on the market. A litigant might or might not choose the same person
to be her "champion" in court and her champertor to insure the litiga-
tion's success. 39
Although such pretrial legal-cost insurance has not been dis-
cussed in academic literature, numerous commentators have discussed
the sale of tort claims. For example, Professor Cooter has suggested
creation of a market for "unmatured tort claims" based on accidents
36. Judgment Purchase Corporation (JPC), a San Francisco based company, researches law-
suits to determine which cases are likely to succeed on appeal and then offers plaintiffs cash in
advance in return for a percentage of the judgment if the judgment is upheld (for example,
$1,200*cash for a $1,500 interest in the judgment). If the plaintiff loses on appeal, JPC does not
get repaid. See JUDGMENT PURCHASE CORPORATION, A WinrE PAPER DISCUSSING NON-RE-
COURSE FINANCING FOR MONEY JUDGMENTS ON APPEAL 2 (1995) [hereinafter JPC WHITE PA-
PER]. JPC will "invest" in a state or federal trial court money judgment on appeal that meets the
following criteria:
(i) the judgment amount is $300,000 or greater, excluding interest and costs; (ii) the
judgment debtor has 'deep pockets' or has posted an appeal bond, or other financial
undertaking, sufficient to assure payment of the judgment in full, if sustained on appeal;
(iii) the amount assigned will not exceed 50% of the judgment; and (iv) the judgment
creditor has a commitment to vigorously defend the judgment and the funds needed are
earmarked for payment of qualified counsel.
Id. at 3. The JPC program also can be used by attorneys who want to share with JPC the risks of
contingent-fee arrangements. "JPC's Program also provides attorneys the opportunity to re-
ceive a cash advance on their contingent fee interest in the judgment on appeal or their costs
recovery rights." Id. at 1; see also Cash Paid Up Front For Appeal Judgments, CAL. L. BUS., Apr.
3, 1995, at 1 (discussing the JPC program).
37. Although it is conceivable that litigation insurers could demand control over the litiga-
tion, lawyers and clients are unlikely to accept such a condition. JPC's advances against judg-
ments on appeal do not include legal advice from JPC and "[c]ontrol of the case rests with the
client and attorney." JPC WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 3. For discussion of the agency costs
that arise in the context of insuring litigation controlled by a plaintiff and her attorney and a
comparison with the already very significant agency costs that arise in the context of a contin-
gent-fee arrangement, see infra text accompanying notes 272-79.
38. Unlike a conventional insurance contract in which an insurer agrees to risk responsibil-
ity for potential losses in return for a fixed premium, a litigation insurer would agree to pay
counsel fees as they accrue and to post any bond required under an English rule for opposing
counsel's fees in return for a share of the judgment or settlement, if any. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 267, 317-18.
39. The two choices would not be entirely independent-choice of lawyers would probably
affect champerty terms available on the market.
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that may occur in the future.40 Professor Goetz, however, correctly
points out that he is "more skeptical of the practical success of such
markets for [unmatured tort claims] than for matured claims where
the tort has already occurred."'41 Also, even a market for matured tort
claims might not be practical outside of a context ideally suited for
evaluation and pricing of such claims. This Article seeks to explore
the feasibility of one such context-albeit a context more limited than
that envisioned by either Cooter or Goetz-a market for legal-cost
insurance.
Other commentators have suggested lawsuit syndication through
securities offerings as a method of raising money to cover litigation
expenses.42 In a few instances, this technique has been tried, with va-
rying degrees of success. 43 However, securitization is difficult and
costly because of federal and state registration and disclosure require-
40. See Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383,
383 (1989). Such a market, he argues, would allow potential plaintiffs to sell tort rights con-
nected with wealth-neutral events (such as pain and suffering) while buying better insurance for
wealth-implicating events (such as lost wages). See id. at 384-85.
41. Charles J. Goetz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims": Col-
lateral Implications, 75 VA. L. REV. 413, 422 (1989); see also CHARLES J. GOETZ, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 43 (1984).
A plausible argument might be that assignability would produce a more objective valu-
ation of claims by people who are specialists in such evaluations. After all, if the pres-
ent holder of a claim placed an unduly low value on it, there would be money to be
made from detecting this fact and purchasing the claim for a figure closer to its real
value. Indeed, a market-like valuation of one's claim might induce a downward revalu-
ation by one who overvalues his cause of action.
Id.
42. Donald L. Abraham, Note, Investor Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two
Barriers to An Alternative Form of Litigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1297 (1992);
Daniel C. Cox, Comment, Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity in Legal Grievances,
35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 153 (1990); see also Roy D. Simon, Jr., Lawsuit Syndications: Buying Stock
in Justice, 1989 Bus. Soc'y. REV. 10, 10.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92, 97-99. One such attempt was the registration
in 1974 of 480,000 shares of common stock in a corporation headquartered in Larchmont, New
York, to raise capital for its Prepaid Legal Services Program, a scheme essentially similar to
legal-cost insurance plans now available in Great Britain, see ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note
27, at 129, and for its Litigation Division, which would pursue class actions believed to be in the
public interest. Attorneys interested in filing class actions would arrange for the Division to pay
legal fees and other expenses in return for a share of the recovery if the suits were successful.
Public Equity Corp., Preliminary Prospectus, at 28-30 (Dec. 5, 1974) (copy on file with author,
original on file with the SEC). The Corporation does not appear to have contemplated funding
suits by individual plaintiffs, at least at the outset. The "Certain Risk Factors" section of the
preliminary prospectus discloses that the contemplated lawsuit funding scheme might be chain-
pertous, but the registrant took the position that most of these restrictions were void because
they were against public policy and/or unconstitutional. Id. at 7-13. However, the Corporation's
actual potential for profit was perhaps best described in Part B of the "Risk Factors" section,
which stated that "[t]he successful public underwriting and operation of this Corporation de-
pend, in large part, on the active 'social consciousness' of a significant bloc of ordinary American
citizens." Id. at 13.
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ments,4 and, in most litigation, legal fees are not sufficient to justify a
public offering or even a private placement of securities.45 This Arti-
cle suggests a switch from the securitization paradigm to an insurance
paradigm46 that replicates for litigants the multitude of insurance con-
tracts that facilitate transactions in other areas of the economy.4 7
Part I of this Article discusses how both the common law and
ethics codes reinforce lawyers' dominant position in the market for
champerty, as well as legal and practical hurdles confronted when par-
ties seek to finance litigation outside of the contingent-fee paradigm.
Part II discusses case law, ethics rules, and statutes governing reasona-
bleness of contingent fees and summarizes the debate over whether
contingent fees should be regulated. Part II further suggests that cur-
rent thinking on what fees are reasonable might have to change if an
English rule were to be adopted and lawyers were willing to insure
their clients against liability for opponents' legal fees. Part II finally
concludes that regulation of contingent fees, whether by the courts on
a case-by-case basis or through a more formal structure such as the
Brickman Proposal, is needed to protect litigants from excessive fees.
However, such regulation is a poor substitute for a competitive mar-
ket, and this Article suggests that in at least some areas of litigation a
competitive market for nonlawyer legal-cost insurance might be
sensible.
Part III discusses how contingent fees are currently priced in a
market where lawyers are the only providers of legal-cost insurance
44. For example, see registration requirements under § 5 of the 1933 Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77f (1994).
45. See Abraham, supra note 42, at 1298-99 (urging that the champerty doctrine be repealed
and that syndicated lawsuits be exempted from registration under securities laws). Securities
laws most likely would not apply to the legal-cost insurance contracts discussed in this Article.
See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (defining an "investment contract," for
purposes of the definition of a security under § 2(1) of the 1933 Securities Act, to mean an
agreement, "transaction or scheme whereby a person invests money in a common enterprise and
is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of [others]"). There is no common enterprise, and
thus no investment contract or security, where an arrangement is pursuant to private negotia-
tions between parties and there is no offering to the public. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982). A private arrangement between a plaintiff and a litigation insurer, like
most other insurance contracts, would likely fall within this exception.
46. Although this Article adopts the insurance paradigm for risk spreading in litigation, it is
not necessary, or even particularly desirable, that insurance companies perform this function, as
opposed to other institutional investors. Insurance companies would face obvious conflicts of
interest in selling legal-cost insurance to plaintiffs suing their own insureds or the insureds of
other insurance companies. The risk of insurers colluding to manipulate settlement negotiations
and even the prosecution of lawsuits is substantial if a relatively small group of insurance com-
panies is given a critical role on both sides of tort litigation. See infra text accompanying note
275.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 270-71.
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for most plaintiffs. The prevalent pricing pattern reveals some of the
characteristics of tie-in arrangements48 whereby sellers require cus-
tomers to purchase one product (for example, legal-cost insurance) in
order to purchase another (for example, legal services). Lawyers who
charge a flat contingent rate rather than discount fees for cases likely
to result in substantial judgments also may be using price discrimina-
tion, a common practice in markets, such as those for airline tickets or
college tuitions,49 that are not fully competitive. The essence of price
discrimination is that buyers are charged different amounts according
to what they can afford to pay and/or what a particular product or
service is worth to them, rather than according to the marginal cost of
the seller. Some buyers thus pay more than they would in a more
competitive market.
Part IV examines both economic and ethical costs and benefits
incurred by litigants, lawyers, and society when litigants use lawyers,
instead of nonlawyer litigation insurers, to finance and insure litigation.
Costs of lawyer-insured litigation include (i) perverse incentives for
lawyers to engage in unethical conduct directed at winning large judg-
ments,50 a cost primarily imposed on participants in the legal system
and on consumers who purchase tort liability insurance; (ii) perverse
incentives for lawyers to use litigation and settlement strategies that
do not maximize client welfare, a cost primarily imposed on clients;51
(iii) perverse incentives for clients to evade contingent-fee arrange-
ments and for lawyers to engage in opportunistic conduct vis-a-vis
their partners in sharing contingent fees, a cost imposed on lawyers
themselves; and (iv) costs imposed on lawyers because they are poor
48. See infra text accompanying notes 163-82.
49. See Davidson Goldin, Increasingly, Those Paying Full Tuition Aid Poorer Peers, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1995, at B7. Although college tuition pricing has been described as "an income
transfer from those who can afford to pay tuition to those who can't," id. (quoting Charles Lenth
of the Education Commission of the States), in many instances there is no such transfer. Rather,
discriminatory pricing is used to charge each student what they can afford to pay, just as different
passengers are often charged different prices on airlines. In most instances, student loan pro-
ceeds and student cash contributions allow colleges to recover their marginal cost of educating a
student (or the increase in the college's costs due to educating that student). For a discussion of
price discrimination, see infra text accompanying notes 183-94. Although a college could always
abandon discriminatory pricing in favor of need-based admissions (admitting a pool of appli-
cants with a higher demand curve allowing all or most to be charged full tuition), this alternative
is not without costs to the college in terms of both the academic qualifications and diversity of its
student body.
50. DEREK BOK, Tim COST OF TALENT 141-42 (1993).
51. Although there can be abuses when lawyers represent a single client, see infra text ac-
companying notes 201-22, some of the greatest abuses are in product liability class actions. See
Barry Meier, Fistfuls of Coupons, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1995, at D1 (criticizing settlements where
plaintiffs' lawyers get cash and plaintiffs get near worthless coupons toward purchase of addi-
tional products from the defendant).
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diversifiers of risks from contingent-fee litigation.5 2 Concerning this
last point, Part IV also discusses the concept of diversifiable risk as it
is used in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and concludes
that much of lawyers' risk from contingent-fee litigation is potentially
diversifiable, but that lawyers are poor diversifiers of litigation risk.53
The third and fourth above mentioned costs of lawyer-insured litiga-
tion may be passed by lawyers on to clients in the form of higher con-
tingent fees.
These costs of using lawyers as litigation insurers are counterbal-
anced by some benefits. One benefit to clients of using their lawyers
to insure litigation is economies of scope:5 4 lawyers already become
familiar with facts underlying a claim in order to litigate the claim and
usually can evaluate the claim to fix a contingent fee without substan-
tial additional expenditure of time and effort. Other litigation insur-
ers would have to evaluate the claim themselves, making champerty
for them more expensive.55 Another possible benefit of using lawyer
instead of nonlawyer litigation insurers is that contingent fees may en-
courage lawyers to work harder to obtain higher judgments for clients,
making lawyers' services more valuable. However, these positive in-
centives must be weighed against perverse incentives created when
contingent-fee lawyers' interests diverge from their clients' interests. 56
In sum, there are both costs and benefits of using lawyers instead
of nonlawyers to share the risks of litigation. Furthermore, these costs
and benefits vary depending on the circumstances of each legal repre-
52. The ABA correctly points out that lawyers are better risk diversifiers than most clients.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389, at 11 (1994) ("The
contingent fee system essentially shifts the risk of litigation or other legal endeavor from a risk
averse client to the lawyer who may be more risk neutral because of his ability to recoup his
losses through his handling of other legal matters on a contingent basis."). Nonetheless, lawyers
practicing alone or in smaller firms are poor risk diversifiers when compared with outside litiga-
tion insurers. See infra text accompanying notes 238-61.
53. One obvious alternative, conducting contingent-fee litigation in large law firms, is a rel-
atively unattractive diversification strategy, in part because partners' pay in many firms is still
tied to partners' individual billings and in part because contingent fees increase the likelihood of
opportunistic conduct of partners toward each other. See infra text accompanying notes 223-37.
54. "[E]conomies of scope reflect the reduction in production costs that result from the
joint production of a number of different products." Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Busi-
ness Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 298 n.163 (1994) (citing David J.
Teece, Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39
(1982)) (emphasis added).
55. However, a closer look at the "evaluation" by lawyers of claims that precedes contin-
gent-fee arrangements reveals that often relatively little effort is expended. If so, economies of
scope enjoyed by lawyers should be relatively insignificant. See infra text accompanying notes
263-68.
56. Areas in which contingent-fee lawyers' interests may diverge from the interests of their




sentation. This Article suggests that the best approach is to allow cli-
ents to choose the arrangements they prefer after they have been
informed of the full range of choices available to them in a competi-
tive market. As an alternative, or in addition, to regulating contingent
fees,57 the legal system should facilitate efforts by nonlawyers to make
legal-cost insurance available to plaintiffs.
Part V discusses how, if nurtured by some revisions to codes of
professional responsibility and allowed to develop free of common
law constraints, the market might reduce the cost to plaintiffs of legal-
cost insurance. Because third-party investors could be better diver-
sifiers of risk than most plaintiffs' lawyers, 58 risk premiums built into
contingent fees might fall. This Article suggests, however, that a com-
petitive market for legal-cost insurance will function well only if law-
yers are required to cooperate with third-party litigation insurers and
perhaps also to inform clients that they should obtain several quotes
on the market before entering into a contingent-fee arrangement.
Finally, Part VI revisits the English rule and discusses how a com-
petitive market for legal-cost insurance might alleviate some of the
inequity inherent in requiring losers to pay winners' legal expenses.
Without passing judgment on the alleged advantages and disadvan-
tages of the English rule,59 this Article concludes that such a rule
could more effectively accomplish at least one of its alleged objectives,
sorting out claims that should be litigated from claims that should not,
if defendants and plaintiffs alike could obtain legal-cost insurance.
Risks of losing would affect insurance rates (the portion of any judg-
ment demanded by the insurer), and insurance might not be available
for the weakest cases. Parties thus would have incentives to settle or
abandon cases they are unlikely to win, but would not be handicapped
in the civil litigation system on account of their aversion to risk. Re-
distribution among litigants of costs of commencing and defending liti-
57. Regulation may still be needed in situations where a competitive market for champerty
does not succeed in making more options available to plaintiffs or if plaintiffs are not adequately
informed of those options.
58. As JPC points out in its promotional materials, "[a]ttorneys sometimes find themselves
in need of cash. An outstanding contingent fee interest in a judgment on appeal or substantial
illiquid costs advanced claim can create tremendous financial pressure on an attorney, a law
practice and a family." JPC wHITrrE PAPER, supra note 36, at 2. JPC, presumably a better diver-
sifier of risk than most plaintiffs' lawyers, offers to "convert this interest in the money judgment
into immediate cash, safe from the risks of a court reversal. Like the plaintiff, if the case is
ultimately lost and there is no recovery, the attorney keeps the money and JPC receives noth-
ing." Id.
59. Alleged advantages and disadvantages of the English rule have already been discussed
extensively in academic literature. See supra note 23.
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gation would be possible without tilting the legal playing field toward
the risk neutral and well-to-do.
I. EVOLUTION OF LAWYERS' MARKET POWER IN CHAMPERTY
A. The Common Law of Champerty and the Exception for
Lawyers in the United States
Legal-cost insurance, such as that provided in a contingent-fee
arrangement, is essentially a form of champerty. Champerty6o is a
bargain by which a "third person undertakes to carry on the litigation
at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a
part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered. '61 Champerty
was prohibited at common law in England.62 Similar prohibitions
were aimed at maintenance 63 and barratry.64 In England, champerty
laws still prohibit contingent fees,65 and alleged champertors, as well
as their accusers are usually lawyers.
66
Gradually, lawyers' contingent fees were excepted from the doc-
trine of champerty in the United States. New York's Field Code of
1848 "repealed the statutes regulating lawyers' fees" and thereby con-
tributed to "legitimization of contingent fees."'67 Later revisions of the
Code provided that fees would be governed by lawyer-client agree-
60. "Champerty" was derived from "Champart," campi pars or campi partus, a type of me-
dieval feudal tenure consisting of "a grant in which the reddendum was a specified quota of the
actual produce of the land granted." Radin, supra note 28, at 61. "The tenant by champart then
was only a partial owner of the land he held. He was bound to share its rents and profits with
the grantor." Id.
61. BLACK'S LAW DiCrONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co.,
525 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)).
62. Under the Statute of Westminster I of 1275, Chapter 15, no royal officer "shall maintain
pleas 'for lands, tenements or other things, for to have part or profit thereof ....' Radin, supra
note 28, at 62 (quoting 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND (1929) 261; 3 EDW. I c. 25).
63. Maintenance, "the support given by a feudal magnate to his retainers in all their suits,"
was unlawful under the Star Chamber Act of 1487 and the Statute of Liveries of 1504. Radin,
supra note 28, at 64 (citing 3 HENRY VII, C. 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM ii, 509; 19 HENRY VII, c.
14; STATUTES OF THE REALM ii, 658).
Maintenance may be said to be the last flaring up of feudalism. It contained echoes of
the system of private war and constituted the last of the attempts of feudal landowners
to create within the limits and the framework of the regnum, a continuance of the
centrifugal tendencies inherent in the feudal theory.
Id. at 65.
64. Barratry, or habitual maintenance, was a criminal offense in England. See Radin, supra
note 28, at 65 (citing 8 COKE'S REP. 36b; Statute of 34 Eow. III. c.1.).
65. Section 63 of the Solicitor's Act of 1932 expressly forbids contingent fees. Radin, supra
note 28, at 76 (citing Solicitor's Act of 1932); Janice Toran, Settlement, Sanctions, and Attorney
Fees: Comparing English Payment into Court and Proposed Rule 68, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 301, 321
n.124 (1986).
66. Radin, supra note 28, at 66.




ment "which is not restrained by law." 68 Many of these developments
occurred at a time when the Industrial Revolution gave rise to acci-
dents in which working-class plaintiffs had legitimate claims, but no
money to pay lawyers. 69 By 1877, the United States Supreme Court
observed that "[tihe proposition (i.e., that contingent fees are legal) is
one beyond legitimate controversy. ' 70
The common law also forbids, in addition to champerty, assign-
ment of all or part of a cause of action. 71 It is true that the modern
legal system provides many exceptions to this rule. Contract claims
are generally assignable as are many types of tort claims for property
damage.72 Although personal injury claims generally cannot be as-
signed, there is an exception for subrogation by a claimant to an inter-
ested third party, usually her insurance company.73 When permitted,
assignment of an entire action is a risk-shifting device under which the
assignee assumes all the risk of litigation and the plaintiff assignor
forgoes a potential judgment in return for a fixed payment. Assign-
ment of part of an action is a risk-sharing device where part of the
potential award from a lawsuit is exchanged for money or services.
Such a partial assignment of course occurs when a lawyer charges a
contingent fee, and this assignment is permitted despite the prohibi-
68. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 37 (citing 1876 N.Y. CODE OF REMEDIAL
JUSTICE § 66); see also Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers:
Impermissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 149, 171-76
(1988).
69. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 37 (citing LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 422-23 (2d ed. 1973)); Radin, supra note 28, at 71.
70. Radin, supra note 28, at 71 (quoting Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548, 556 (1877)).
71. The purchase of a lawsuit was forbidden under Roman law and, according to Diocletian,
"was against public policy, contra bonos mores." Radin, supra note 28, at 54 (citing COD. JUST.
2, 12, 15). Modem tort law also prohibits purchase or sale of most tort claims. See Sprung v.
Jaffee, 147 N.E.2d 6, 8-9 (N.Y. 1957); N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 488, 489 (McKinney 1983).
72. GOETZ, supra note 41, at 39 (citing Harold R. Weinberg, Tort Claims as Intangible Prop-
erty: An Exploration from an Assignee's Perspective, 64 Ky. L.J. 49 (1975); 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assign-
ments §§ 34-45 (1963)). A judgment, even a judgment on appeal, generally can be assigned. See
discussion of the JPC WHirE PAPER, supra note 36.
73. GoETz, supra note 41, at 39. Sometimes, the assignment is to a hospital, doctor, or
some other party that incurred expense because of the tort in question. See Richard v. National
Transp. Co., 285 N.Y.S. 870, 872 (Mun. Ct. 1936) (injured party may assign claim to a hospital).
Subrogation often allows an insurer to recover from a person committing a tort against its in-
sured. See generally, Spencer L. Kimball & Don A. Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subroga-
tion, 60 MICH. L. REV. 841, 841 (1962). The legal-cost insurance discussed in this Article is
different in that the insurer usually is disinterested in the case prior to the assignment and the
insured assigns to the insurer a percentage of her claim instead of a fixed amount from the claim.
Furthermore, this assignment is the insured's "premium" on a new legal-cost insurance contract,
not a mechanism by which an insurer seeks to recover from a tortfeasor amounts paid out under
a preexisting contract.
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tion on many other assignments of tort claims74 and despite the fact
that a lawyer is prohibited from otherwise acquiring an interest in the
subject matter of her litigation.75
Allowance of lawyers' contingent fees in the United States, how-
ever, did not bring about the demise of prohibitions on other forms of
champerty, maintenance, and assignment. Rather, there is significant
variation among jurisdictions as to the extent to which these doctrines
are enforced. Some states, such as Florida, 76 Illinois,77 Kansas, 78 Mis-
souri,79 Pennsylvania,80 South Dakota,81 and Wisconsin8 2 bar cham-
perty. Connecticut avoids a categorical approach and inquires into
74. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 13-101 (McKinney 1989); 6 AM. JUR. 2 D Assignments § 37
(1963).
75. ABA Model Rule 1.8 (j) reads:
A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject
matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.80); see MODEL CODE EC 5-7 (1981) ("The possibility of an adverse
effect upon the exercise of free judgment by a lawyer on behalf of his client during litigation
generally makes it undesirable for the lawyer to acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of his
client or otherwise to become financially interested in the outcome of the litigation.").
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 877.01, 877.02 (West 1994). For discussion of case law on cham-
perty generally, see 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance §§ 3-4 (1991).
77. "[T]here are two essential elements in every champertous agreement: First, there must
be an undertaking by one person to defray the expenses, in whole or in part, of another's suit;
second, an agreement or promise on the part of the latter to divide with the former the proceeds
of the litigation in the event the prosecution was successful." Brush v. City of Carbondale, 82
N.E. 252, 255 (Ill. 1907) (agreement whereby appellant contracted with the City of Carbondale
to pay expenses of City's appeal of case alleging illegal sale of intoxicating liquors, although not
champertous because second element was not met, could not be enforced insofar as it might
prevent the City from settling or discontinuing suit).
78. Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 811 (Kan. 1956) (agreement between genealogists
and intestate heir whereby former would pay litigation expenses in return for one-quarter of the
heir's recovery from estate was champertous, and thus unenforceable).
79. See Schnabel v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 525 S.W.2d. 819, 824-25 (Mo. 1975) (although
"the law of champerty and maintenance is in force in Missouri," id. at 823, an agreement
whereby manager of radio station agreed with replacement worker hired during strike to pay all
attorneys' fees and costs of litigation for defamation suit by worker against union was found to
be valid because the employer believed it had an interest in the litigation).
80. Belfonte v. Miller, 243 A.2d 150, 151-52, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1968) (invalidating contract
in which a realtor hired an appraiser to appraise real estate to assist in obtaining damages in an
eminent domain proceeding, and appraiser was to receive a percentage of the recovery).
81. McKellips v. Mackintosh, 475 N.W.2d 926, 929 (S.D. 1991) (agreement under which
bank officer would lend litigants $3,000 to bring trademark infringement lawsuit in exchange for
percentage of the award and/or settlement held "champertous and void as against public
policy").
82. See D'Angelo v. Cornell Paperboard Prods., 120 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Wis. 1963). The Wis-
consin Supreme Court held that the agreement where an injured party and his workman's com-
pensation insurer assigned their causes of action against an automobile liability insurer to a
comprehensive liability insurer was against public policy insofar as the agreement assigned
amounts in excess of amounts already paid by the assignee to the injured party. Id.
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whether a transaction violates public policy.83 California,84 Arizona,85
New Jersey,86 New York,87 and Louisiana 88 avoid champerty and simi-
lar doctrines. Although limited inroads have been made by way of
third-party financing of legal expenses,89 the common law continues to
cast a shadow over schemes that might challenge lawyers' dominant
position in the market for champerty.
One such challenger was New York attorney Carl Person. In the
1970s, Person sued several New York bar associations alleging that
New York's Judiciary Law, Appellate Division Rules, and Lawyer's
Code of Professional Responsibility forbade transfer for value of
shares in a lawsuit. These prohibitions, he claimed, unconstitutionally
stifled fair trial of antitrust cases and other costly litigation.90 The
83. "The common law of champerty and maintenance has never been adopted in this state
as applied to civil actions, and the true and exclusive inquiry... is whether the transaction relied
upon is opposed to public policy." Bongaret v. Lampasona, 282 A.2d 580, 581 (Conn. 1971)
(maintenance of suit that had been assigned by plaintiff to her insurance company did not violate
public policy).
84. See Muller v. Muller, 23 Cal. Rptr. 900, 901 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (the doctrines of
"champerty and maintenance" are not recognized in California).
85. See Strahan v. Haynes, 262 P. 995, 996-97 (Ariz. 1928) (holding that assignee's com-
plaint for specific performance of real estate purchase contract, clearly demonstrating champerty
and maintenance, should not be subject to demurrer because the court believed the doctrines did
not apply in Arizona).
86. A v. D, 482 A.2d 530, 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) ("The doctrines of mainte-
nance and champerty do not prevail in New Jersey"; the court will instead look to the reasona-
bleness of an agreement.).
87. "In New York champerty and maintenance is not a viable defense except as provided by
statute...." Lost Lots Assocs. v. Bruyn, 415 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (App. Div. 1979). The Court held
that § 489 of New York's Judiciary Law prohibits only purchase of choses in action, claims, or
demands and does not prohibit transfer of a real property deed to a corporation owned by three
lawyers who agreed to prosecute an action to establish title and share with transferor the pro-
ceeds from settlement or subsequent sale of the property. Id. at 101.
88. Hawthorne v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 210 So. 2d 110, 112 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (A
"litigious right" is transferred when a complaint and answer are filed and then transferred; under
the Louisiana Civil Code, a person "against whom a litigious right has been transferred, may get
himself released by paying to the transferee the real price of the transfer, together with interest
from its date.").
89. For the discussion of the JPC scheme for purchase of an interest in judgments on ap-
peal, see supra note 36. Arguably, the JPC scheme is not champertous because JPC is purchas-
ing an interest in a judgment rather than a lawsuit yet to go to trial.
90. Person v. Association of Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 139, 140-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977). Among the more significant
prohibitions alleged to impede Person's scheme to syndicate an antitrust suit were the Model
Code's DR 2-103(D) (restricting a lawyer from assisting an organization that promotes use of
the lawyer's services) and DR 3-102 ("[A] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a
nonlawyer."); the Appellate Division's First Department Rules § 603.18 (Champerty and Main-
tenance) and Second Department Rules § 691.15, which forbid, among other things, a lawyer
"giving in his own or in another's name, before or after suit, a promise of anything of value.., to
induce the placing of a claim in his hands or in the hands of another for the purpose of suing on
it or defending against it"; and the Judiciary Law §§ 479, 481, and 482 "mak[ing] it unlawful for
any [person] to solicit or procure through solicitation a retainer for an attorney or to make a
business of doing so .... Person, 414 F. Supp. at 141.
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District Court examined Person's scheme to finance an antitrust suit
through a public offering, 91 and it held that he was sufficiently unlikely
to be in violation of these provisions that his motion for a ruling on
their constitutionality should be denied.92 Nonetheless, the Court did
not endorse Person's scheme and did not define the extent of New
York's prohibitions on third-party funding of lawsuits. 93
Uncertainty surrounding champerty and related doctrines thus
has a chilling effect on the market for nonlawyer financing and insur-
ance of lawsuits. The fact that lawyers usually will not encourage such
arrangements when they can work for contingent fees instead also
makes nonlawyer legal-cost insurance an unrealistic alternative. 94 In-
vestors are unlikely to fund lawsuits without the cooperation of, and
particularly adequate information from, plaintiffs lawyers,95 and law-
yers, with a few exceptions like Carl Person, have no incentive to
favor unorthodox methods to finance their own fees outside of the
contingent-fee paradigm.
B. Commercial Claims
Large commercial claims, unlike claims by most individual plain-
tiffs and small businesses, are often de facto, if not de jure, exempt
from restrictions on champerty and assignment. The reason is simple:
claim holders can incorporate or form partnerships, ostensibly to de-
velop business opportunities related to the subject matter of the claim
(for example, to develop and market a patent). Interests in the newly
formed entity can then be sold to investors and the proceeds used to
finance litigation (for example, a patent infringement suit). The inves-
tors then expect to receive a share of any judgment or settlement in
capital appreciation or future dividends. Alternatively, lawyers can
91. Person sought to use the proceeds of a public stock offering to finance litigation costs of
an antitrust suit against Parker Brothers and General Mills seeking $32 million in damages. Cox,
supra note 42, at 154-55. Although Person promised to return investors' principal without inter-
est if the lawsuit did not succeed, the offering was a failure. Id. at 155-56.
92. The Court held that the issues involved did not require convening a three-judge district
court because
there [did] not appear to be any threat of action to prevent partial assignments of the
rights or action sued on, and there [was] no basis, simply for that reason, for seeking to
enjoin state officers from enforcing statutes and rules of, at best, doubtful applicability
and in advance of their infraction.
Person, 414 F. Supp. at 142.
93. In federal courts, antitrust claims generally may be assigned. Jefferson County Pharma-
ceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Labs., 656 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1981).
94. Lawyers in Great Britain, where contingent fees are generally not available, by contrast
have even contemplated a contingency fund somewhat similar to the legal-cost insurance sug-
gested in this Article. See infra note 298 and accompanying text.
95. See infra text accompanying note 269.
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receive a share in a plaintiff corporation in exchange for their serv-
ices.96 Patent cases are sometimes funded in this manner, 97 as are
some suits on promissory notes.98 Only if litigants directly sell inter-
ests in a lawsuit itself, or create confusion about who controls a law-
suit, do they run afoul of prohibitions on champerty and assignment.99
Such arrangements, however, are not practical or even available
for a wide range of litigation, including claims for personal injury, for
civil rights violations, on behalf of defrauded investors, or by persons
injured by defective consumer products. Thus, for many litigants, law-
yers' domination of the market for champerty is an unavoidable fact
of life. Although this market domination does not reach the point of
monopoly unless lawyers in a particular geographic or practice area
collude to act as a single firm,10 0 pricing in such a market is likely to be
less competitive than it would be in a less exclusive market for
champerty.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CONTINGENT FEES
A. Existing Law on Contingent Fees
The Model Code and the Model Rules set few specific guidelines
for contingent fees, or for fees in general, except to state that lawyers'
fees must be reasonable.101 Using somewhat circular language, the
96. See N.Y. State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 635 (1974) (lawyer may
accept stock as fee).
97. Patent claimant Gordon Gould, the inventor of the optic laser, transferred part of his
interest in laser patents to Patlex Corporation. Patlex spent $300,000 litigating his claim and
then sold shares of its own stock to finance the litigation. After a string of court victories, Patlex
earned about $7 million annually in royalties and licensing fees. Cox, supra note 42, at 156-57.
98. In 1981, Micro/Vest Corporation was formed by investors to buy a convertible promis-
sory note written by William Millard, "the founder of Computerland," in favor of Marriner &
Co., a venture capital firm which had provided him with seed money. MicroNest then sued on
the note and sold its own shares to investors to pay for the lawsuit. A one percent share of
Micro/Vest was estimated to be worth $5 million after MicroNest was awarded an equity interest
in Computerland and punitive damages and fees of $141.5 million. Id. at 157-58.
99. See, e.g., id. at 158-59. Charlie Hall, the inventor of the waterbed, organized an invest-
ment group to buy shares in his lawsuits against alleged infringers of his patent. He was ordered
to cut his ties with his investors, however, when a federal court in San Francisco became con-
cerned about the effect the investors' involvement would have on the settlement process. Id.
(citing Edmund L. Andrews, Patents: Financing Investors' Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1989,
§ 1, at 36; Richard B. Schmitt et al., Syndicated Lawsuits Suffer a Setback, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22,
1989, at B1; Roy D. Simon, Jr., Lawsuit Syndication: Buying Stock in Justice, Bus. & Soc'v REV.,
Spring 1989, at 10 (1989)); see Katherine Corcoran, Someone's Been Lying in Hill's Water Bed,
L.A. TIMES, May 15, 1991, at El.
100. A monopoly exists if (1) one firm produces a good or service, (2) the monopolist does
not have rivals or competitors, and (3) new firms cannot enter the market. S. CHARLES MAU-
RICE ET AL., MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS: APPLIED MICROECONOMICS FOR DECISION MAKING
496-503 (4th ed. 1992).
101. ABA Model Rule 1.5(a)-(d) reads:
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Model Code states that a fee is excessive when an ordinarily prudent
lawyer would regard it to be excessive.' 02 Under the Model Rules, so
long as her fee is reasonable, a lawyer not only may devote time to a
case, but "may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the re-
payment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter
.... -103 Although contingent fees are allowed in a wide variety of
circumstances, they are prohibited in some forms of litigation, includ-
ing criminal' 4 and divorce 05 cases. Apart from contingent fees, "[a]
(a) A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable. The factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions in-
volved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular
employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the
services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented the client, the basis or rate of the
fee shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a
reasonable time after commencing the representation.
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is
rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph
(d) or other law. A contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and shall state the
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percent-
ages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of a settlement, trial or appeal,
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such
expenses are to be deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. Upon
conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a
written statement stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery,
showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.
(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect:
(1) any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or amount of which is
contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or
support, or property settlement in lieu thereof; or
(2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal case.
102. "A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary pru-
dence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable
fee." MODEL CODE DR 2-106(B). Presumably, an ordinarily prudent lawyer applying this stan-
dard would focus not on the inherent reasonableness of a fee but on determining what fee other
ordinarily prudent lawyers would think reasonable. DR 2-106(B) also enumerates factors to be
taken into account in determining the reasonableness of a fee. These factors are substantially
the same as those enumerated in Model Rule 1.5.
103. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.8(E)(1). By contrast, DR 5-103(B) requires that the client ulti-
mately be responsible for costs and expenses: "A lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses
of litigation, including court costs, expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination,
and costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for
such expenses." See Janet E. Findlater, The Proposed Revision of DR 5-103(B): Champerty and
Class Actions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1667, 1667 (1981).
104. See MODEL CODE DR 2-106(C); MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.5(d)(2).
105. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.5(d)(1); MODEL CODE EC 2-20; Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76
(1877); Roberds v. Sweitzer, 733 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Mo. 1987). But see Krieger v. Bulpitt, 251
P.2d 673, 674 (Cal. 1953) (contingent fee allowed in divorce action).
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lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of
action."106
Furthermore, a contingent fee must be appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. Ethical Consideration 5-7 of the Model Code requires:
"[B]ecause [the lawyer] is in a better position to evaluate a cause of
action, [the lawyer] should enter into a contingent fee arrangement
only in those instances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the
client."'1 7 At first, it might be difficult to imagine how a billing ar-
rangement could be "beneficial to the client" without making the law-
yer worse off. Ex-post, after conclusion of litigation, either the client
or the lawyer will be better off because a contingent fee was used in-
stead of an hourly rate; the other will be worse off. Ex-ante, however,
when the arrangement was made, both lawyer and client might expect
to be better off with the contingent fee. The lawyer might anticipate
higher earnings and fewer collection difficulties, and the client might
benefit from shifting some of her risk of losing to a lawyer better able
to diversify against that risk. Nonetheless, such will not always be the
case, and Ethical Consideration 5-7 suggests that a client who can bear
her own risk of litigation should probably be billed at an hourly rate
instead.' 08
The comments to the Model Rules and Model Code for the most
part address procedural fairness, that is, whether clients are informed
of their options before agreeing to contingent fees-rather than sub-
stantive fairness, and whether a fee is excessive. According to the
Comment to Model Rule 1.5, "[w]hen there is doubt whether a contin-
gent fee is consistent with the client's best interest, the lawyer should
offer the client alternative bases for the fee and explain their implica-
tions."'1 9 Ethical Consideration 2-19 of the Model Code states that
"[i]t is usually beneficial to reduce to writing the understanding of the
parties regarding the fee, particularly when it is contingent." 110
106. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.80).
107. MODEL CODE EC 5-7.
108. Enforcing this standard would be difficult because hourly and contingent fees are diffi-
cult to compare (the expected value of the contingency is usually higher ex-ante on account of
the risk involved, but can be higher or lower than the hourly fee ex-post). Perhaps because this
comparison is so difficult, EC 5-7 is an ethical consideration instead of a disciplinary rule. How-
ever, it is important to note that some courts apply ethical considerations "as if they were
mandatory in character." Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 51 n.88.
109. MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.5 cmt.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Respon-
sibility, Informal Op. 1521 (1986) ("[W]hen there is any doubt whether a contingent fee is consis-
tent with the client's best interest, [and the client is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee,] the
lawyer must offer the client the opportunity to engage counsel on a reasonable fixed fee basis
before entering into a contingent fee arrangement.").
110. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.5(c) (requiring that the agreement be in writing).
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Case law expands on standards in the Model Rules and Model
Code, but there is no bright-line test to determine when contingent
fees are excessive.111 A contingent fee may exceed a fixed fee for the
same work, particularly "in a case where there is very little chance of a
successful verdict. 11 2 "On the other hand, when a case is virtually
certain to result in a large verdict, when both liability and great dam-
ages are easy to prove, the small chances of nonrecovery or of a small
award can justify a correspondingly smaller increase in the attorney's
fee." 113 Courts often take into account the unequal bargaining power
between lawyer and client; a lawyer usually has the burden of proving
that his fee is reasonable, 114 and some courts impose a fiduciary stan-
dard on a lawyer when he negotiates compensation with his clients."
5
As Professor Hazard has observed, "A contract for a fee is, under
general principles of law, a contract between a fiduciary and his pro-
111. For example, in In re Swartz, 686 P.2d 1236, 1239, 1244 (Ariz. 1984), the Supreme Court
of Arizona determined that a contingent fee of one-third of a client's recovery was excessive. In
addition to the factors listed in DR 2-106, the Court considered "a number of factors, including:
•.. the degree of uncertainty or contingency with respect to liability, amount of damages which
may be recovered, or the funds available from which to collect any judgment...." Id. at 1243.
112. Rosquist v. Soo Line R.R., 692 F.2d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 1982). Recognizing that
"chances of success in this case varied on the different parts of the claim," the Court held that "it
was not erroneous to calculate the fee separately for the different plaintiffs sharing the judg-
ment." Id.; see McKenzie Constr. v. Maynard, 823 F.2d 43, 45, 49 (3d Cir. 1987) (contingent fee
not unreasonable where attorney earned $790 per hour rather than his normal hourly rate of
$60).
113. Rosquist, 692 F.2d at 1114; see also Horton v. Butler, 387 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (La. Ct. App.
1980) (one-quarter contingent fee unreasonable where lawyer's only actions to collect insurance
were contacting insurer and accepting a check); Anderson v. Kenelly, 547 P.2d 260, 260-61 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1975) (one-third contingent fee unreasonable where lawyer's only action to assist
widow in collection of claim from life insurance company was to inform insurer of the correct
date her deceased husband enlisted in the Air Force). At least in the view of the ABA, some
form of contingent fee can still be appropriate in cases where liability is certain. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389, at 15 (1994) ("[T]he [Stand-
ing] Committee [on Ethics and Professional Responsibility] concludes that as a general proposi-
tion contingent fees are appropriate and ethical in situations where liability is certain and some
recovery is likely .... That having been said, there may nonetheless be special situations in
which a contingent fee may not be appropriate. For example, if in a particular instance a lawyer
was reasonably confident that as soon as the case was filed the defendant would offer an amount
that the client would accept, it might be that the only appropriate fee would be one based on the
lawyer's time spent on the case .... ").
114. McKenzie Constr., 823 F.2d at 45. The Third Circuit looks for reasonableness both ex-
ante and ex-post. "Although reasonableness at the time of contracting is relevant, consideration
should also be given to whether events occurred after the fee arrangement was made which
rendered a contract fair at the time unfair in its enforcement." Id.
115. Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 739 n.3 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The fiduciary relationship
between an attorney and his client extends even to preliminary consultations between the client
and the attorney regarding the attorney's possible retention."); Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d
735, 739 (Tex. 1964) ("The relation between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in
nature, and their dealings with each other are subject to the same scrutiny, intendments and
imputations as a transaction between an ordinary trustee and his cestui que trust.").
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tected dependent. As such, it is unenforceable unless its terms are fair
to the client."'
1 16
In addition to determining reasonableness on a case-by-case ba-
sis, some jurisdictions limit contingent-fee percentages by rules of
court. 117 A few federal statutes impose similar limits.118 However,
some scholars point out that lawyers respond to such "caps" not by
charging less for their work, but by working less. 119 This same criti-
cism could be directed at any attempt, whether by regulation or case
law, to establish an explicit or implicit cap on contingency percent-
ages. 20 Clearly, regulation of contingent fees, whether by rules of
ethics, case law, or statutes, is an imprecise and ineffective substitute
for a competitive market.
Furthermore, introduction of an English rule could alter contin-
gent-fee structures if lawyers agree to assume clients' potential liabil-
ity for opponents' fees in addition to their own. Lawyers probably
would demand compensation for such additional exposure to loss,
although it should be kept in mind that lawyers also would benefit
under an English rule when they win and collect the value of their
work (presumably at an hourly rate) from opposing counsel as well as
a percentage of the judgment from their client. Nonetheless, courts
reviewing fees probably would adjust upwards their view of what per-
centage fee is reasonable if the lawyer agreed to assume liability under
an English rule. The fee schedules established by statutes or rules of
court might be more resistant to such arrangements whereby lawyers
insure their clients against fee-shifting liability.
116. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., Errics IN THE PRACrICE OF LAW 99 (1978); see also Brick-
man, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 51-53 nn.87, 88 (advocating the fiduciary standard).
117. See N.J. R. Ct. 1:21-7(c) (West 1995) (schedule of contingent fees allows "(1) 331/3% on
the first $250,000 recovered; (2) 25% on the next $250,000 recovered; (3) 20% on the next
$500,000 recovered"; and on all additional amounts a reasonable fee by application to the court);
American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 330 A.2d 350, 355 (N.J. 1974)
(New Jersey Supreme Court had constitutional authority to establish fee schedule).
118. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 62 U.S.C. § 2678 (1994) (limitation of twenty-five percent).
119. Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL
L. REV. 529, 535 (1978). "[Sluch rate ceilings are largely cosmetic, keeping the final fee at what
seems a reasonable level to the outside observer, while still permitting the lawyer covertly to
pick and then milk (through underwork) the lucrative cases." Id. at 581. If percentage fees are
limited, attorneys will simply work fewer hours on each case. See Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel
J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1144-45 (1970).
120. The Brickman Proposal may mitigate this problem because instead of capping percent-
ages it requires percentages to be based on the difference between recovery and the first settle-
ment offer. See infra text accompanying note 131. A lawyer who does not work hard to get a
favorable judgment presumably will not have a large difference between settlement offer and
verdict on which to calculate his contingent fee.
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B. The Contingent-Fee Debate
Lester Brickman's research has focused on market failures that
have led to excessive pricing of contingent fees. Brickman has argued
that "many contingent fees are invalid as a matter of ethics, policy,
and law since they are often used in situations where there is either no
contingency or, although a contingency exists, the contingent fee far
exceeds any legitimate risk premium for the anticipated effort."'121
Professor Brickman's proposed remedy is "a contingent fee percent-
age calculus which consists of four main elements: The lawyer's antici-
pated effort; estimated risk of nonrecovery; settlement value of the
case; and the risk premium ... to compensate for the risk the lawyer
undertakes. ' 122 Professor Brickman recommends that these elements
be "incorporated into a standardized form which should be submitted
to the client and to the court. '123
Kevin Clermont and John Currivan have proposed a "contingent
hourly-percentage fee," a lodestar approach under which a fee in no
event exceeds a plaintiff's recovery, but within this limitation equals
the sum of (i) an hourly charge and (ii) "a percentage . . . of the
amount by which the gross recovery exceeds that time charge."'124 If
the client recovers less than her lawyer's hourly charge, the lawyer
forgoes the difference. If the client recovers more, the lawyer charges
a percentage of the excess. Presumably, this arrangement encourages
a lawyer to further her clients' interests by compensating the lawyer
for investing more time in a case.' 25 This proposal, however, does not
completely resolve conflicts of interest between lawyers and clients126
and does not fully address the most common criticism of contingent
121. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 32. "On the other hand, contingent fees in
excess of fifty percent, which are typically precluded by court rule, statute or custom, should be
upheld in cases where the risks of nonrecovery and greater effort than anticipated are high." Id.
122. Id. at 34.
123. Id.
124. Clermont & Currivan, supra note 119, at 537. Professor Brickman criticizes this propo-
sal on the ground that it "either seeks to supplant bargaining with a judicially fixed percentage [if
the second part of the fee is fixed by a court], or allows for bargaining but does not respond to
overreaching" by the attorney who takes too high a percentage. Brickman, Contingent Fees,
supra note 15, at 135. Professor See proposes that the charge should "be the basic hourly charge
... plus a per-hour charge for risk." Harold See, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee, 1984
UTAH L. REv. 485, 500.
125. This arrangement would presumably overcome incentives lawyers have to spend less
time working on contingent-fee cases than would be optimal from the vantage point of their
clients. See infra text accompanying notes 208-11.
126. Professor Jay has criticized this proposal on a number of grounds, including the likeli-
hood that lawyers' incentives will be skewed if their hourly rate is different than it would be
under a straight hourly contract and the proposal's failure to address lawyers' and clients' often
differing attitudes toward risk. Jay, supra note 11, at 863-66.
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fees, i.e., that lawyers may take an excessive percentage of their cli-
ents' recovery relative to the amount of risk involved.
Professor Herbert Kritzer disputes the necessity for such schemes
and the argument that contingent-fee lawyers are overpaid, at least on
average. 127 He points out that plaintiffs' lawyers incur risk when they
invest time and energy in a portfolio of contingent-fee cases and that
on the whole they do not earn excessive returns, particularly when this
risk is taken into account. "Typical returns from contingent fee work,"
he observes, "are very similar to what would be expected working on
standard hourly rates."'1 28 Otherwise, more lawyers would accept con-
tingent-fee work and "drive down the fees to market levels."' 29 Fur-
thermore, Kritzer cites a "nonscientific survey" indicating "that some
market forces may be working because the percentage charged for
contingent fee work seems to vary rather than being fixed at a simple
33%."130
127. HERBERT M. KRITZER, RHETORIC AND REALITY .. . USES AND ABUSES ... CONTIN-
GENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AMERICAN CONTINGENT FEE
(1995) (paper published by Wisconsin Institute for Legal Studies).
From [reports from various state bar associations conducting economic surveys of their
membership], I find that the median incomes for personal injury plaintiffs lawyers
ranges from a low of $63,000 in New Hampshire (1990) to a high of $108,000 in Texas
(1992). Based on these figures, plus the others I had available, my best estimate of the
median income of personal injury attorneys is $70,000 to $80,000.
Id. at 20-21.
However, market conditions may allow some lawyers working on a contingency to charge
too much while others, perhaps even a majority, are forced to take cases with such low chances
of recovery that even the standard 33% contingency barely provides a living wage. By analogy, a
survey of average profits of drugstores nationwide would reveal little about whether some drug-
stores have sufficient market power to charge excessive prices (indeed, a statistic that mixes
stores on the verge of failure in with alleged monopolists would only confuse the picture). As
Professor Brickman observes, "The reveal/conceal quotient of 'averages' can vary considerably."
Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, app. B at 133.
Another critical factor in any empirical survey of lawyer billing practices is the geographic
area surveyed. If the objective of a survey is to assess whether plaintiffs' lawyers are charging
too much for contingent fees, it makes sense to survey states where the underlying industry-
tort litigation-is most prevalent (measured perhaps by the number of bodily injury claims per
100 automobile accidents). Surveys of states like Wisconsin are helpful if those states have a
high number of bodily injury claims, but less helpful if those states do not. Lester Brickman is
working on a response that criticizes Kritzer's surveys for focusing too much on low injury-to-
accident states like Wisconsin and not focusing enough on large urban areas, such as Philadel-
phia and Los Angeles, where bodily injury claims are the highest (a curious phenomenon as
lower speed limits in urban areas would presumably lead to fewer claims, assuming the speed of
road traffic and not of courtroom traffic is the determining factor). Telephone Interview with
Lester Brickman (Aug. 28, 1995).
128. KRITZER, supra note 127, at 39.
129. Id.
130. Id. Kritzer suggests that this is "[o]ne other issue the data suggest for further investiga-
tion." Id. at 26.
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C. The Brickman Proposal
The Brickman Proposal is designed for personal injury litigation,
although with some modification, it could apply to other tort cases as
well. As set forth in the outline preceding the proposal, its five princi-
pal features are:
(1). Contingency fees may not be charged against settlement
offers made prior to plaintiffs' retention of counsel.
(2). All defendants are given an opportunity to make settle-
ment offers covered by the proposal, but no later than 60 days from
the receipt of a demand for settlement from plaintiffs' counsel. If
the offer is accepted by the plaintiff, counsel fees are limited to
hourly rate charges and are capped at 10% of the first $100,000 of
the offer and 5% of any greater amounts.
(3). Demands for settlement submitted by plaintiffs' counsel
are required to include basic, routinely discoverable information
designed to assist defendants in evaluating plaintiff claims. In turn,
to assist plaintiffs in evaluating defendants' offers, discoverable ma-
terial "in the... [defendant's] possession concerning the alleged
injury upon which [the defendant] relied in making his offer of set-
tlement" must be made available to plaintiffs for a settlement offer
to be effective.
(4). When plaintiffs reject defendants' early offers, contingency
fees may only be charged against net recoveries in excess of such
offers.
(5). If no offer is made within the 60 day period, contingency
fee contracts are unaffected by the proposal.
131
Although the Brickman Proposal enjoys the support of some
prominent members of the bench and bar,132 its critics extend beyond
the plaintiffs' bar. Professor Kritzer disputes the underlying premise
of the Brickman Proposal that contingent fees do not correspond to
risk. 33 Professor Charles Silver questions the view that contingent-
fee lawyers are overpaid, particularly in view of the risks and difficul-
131. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 27-28 (citations omitted). The ABA Standing Com-
mittee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility (the "Standing Committee") takes the position
that the Model Rules do not require contingent-fee lawyers to solicit early settlement offers from
defendants and that a contingent fee may be charged against the amount of a settlement. See
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389, at 37 (1994). But see
Letter from Thomas D. Morgan to David Isbell, Chair of the Standing Committee (Nov. 30,
1994) ("[A] plaintiff's lawyer is professionally obligated to determine what the case is worth after
very little investment of lawyer time. The client should then have the opportunity to accept or
reject the offer. The lawyer may charge a standard contingent fee for anything recovered in
excess of that offer, but only a much lesser amount for the sum that did not require the lawyer's
effort or skill.")
132. See supra note 18.
133. BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 17, at 20-23: KRrrZER, supra note 127, at 1-2.
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ties of their practice. 134 Silver suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers do com-
pete with each other and that "[u]niform percentage fees also may be
desirable products of competition" because uniformity sometimes
benefits lawyers and clients by lowering bargaining costs and "equaliz-
ing lawyers' incentives across caseloads."'1 35 He suggests that regulat-
ing contingent fees, if done at all, should be done in a way that will not
create new problems, possibly including a "shortage of personal injury
lawyers" and a decline in "the quality of representation." 136
It thus is hotly debated whether the limits on contingent fees set
forth in the Brickman Proposal are needed in the first place. If the
market for lawyer-provided champerty already is competitive, such
limits could restrict rather than expand options available to consum-
ers.137 If, on the other hand, the existing market is not competitive,
regulation such as that contemplated by the Brickman Proposal may
be needed if case-by-case scrutiny of contingent fees by courts is inef-
fective at protecting consumers from price gouging. However, it may
also be possible to make the market more competitive by encouraging
nonlawyer litigation insurers to increase the number of options avail-
able to litigants.
The empirical data on contingent fees has been studied by several
legal scholars and will not be re-examined exhaustively in this Arti-
cle.138 Although not all empirical studies suggest lack of competition
among lawyers, the economic models discussed in Part III below may
help explain those empirical studies that do show competition to be
lacking. If further empirical data supports this conclusion, measures
134. Charles Silver, Control Fees? No, Let the Free Market Do Its Job, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18,
1994, at A17, A18. Professor Silver points out that personal injury lawyers incur high costs
(including advertising and malpractice insurance), enjoy low professional prestige, have little
administrative support, handle many clients with little repeat business and get into many fights
with clients. "In Texas, a state denigrated as a haven for personal injury lawyers," the approxi-
mate $23,000 per year difference between their average income and that of all lawyers in Texas
has not caused other lawyers to join the plaintiff's bar. Id. at A17.
135. Id. at A18. "The [Manhattan Institute] report thus fails to show that percentage fees are
either inefficient or the result of constrained competition." Id.
136. Id. Professor Silver's extensive scholarship on fee awards focuses on a number of issues,
including awards to plaintiffs' counsel in class actions and under fee-shifting statutes. See
Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationality in the Law of Attorneys' Fees, 12 REV. Lrrio. 301
(1993); Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865
(1992); A Restitutionary Theory of Attorneys' Fees in Class Actions, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 656
(1991).
137. Price controls can harm not just the supplier, but also consumers. For a detailed discus-
sion on the effects of price controls, see EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACOUELENE M. BROWNING,
MICROECONOMIc THEORY AND APPUCATONs 284-301 (3d ed. 1989). One option that price
controls might preclude for consumers of legal services is retention of a lawyer willing to devote
a substantial amount of time to a contingent-fee case. See supra note 119.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 121-30.
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such as the Brickman Proposal might help curb abuse of market
power by plaintiffs' lawyers. However, the discussion in Part IV of
economic and ethical costs of lawyer champerty suggests that, whether
or not there is adequate competition among contingent-fee lawyers,
nonlawyers sometimes could share the risks of litigation at substan-
tially less cost to themselves and to society. If so, the legal system
should remove impediments to nonlawyer legal-cost insurance.
III. THE MARKET FOR LAWYER CHAMPERTY
A. Components of a Contingent Fee
A lawyer working on a contingent fee is selling three products
combined into one. The first product is legal services. The second is
credit-postponing payment until the client collects on a judgment.
The third is legal-cost insurance-agreeing to waive payment for legal
services that do not achieve favorable results (for example, the value
of legal services in excess of one-third of a judgment) in return for a
premium payment for legal services that do achieve favorable results
(for example, a surcharge equal to the amount by which one-third of a
judgment exceeds the value of the legal services). A fourth product
might be sold by some lawyers in connection with an English rule-
agreeing to assume a client's potential liability for opposing counsel's
fees in return for a larger percentage of any judgment obtained.
Contingent-fee lawyers extend credit to their clients, but so do
hourly rate lawyers who are not fully paid in advance. Although law-
yers customarily bill on a monthly or quarterly basis, there is signifi-
cant variance as to when lawyers actually get paid. 139 Some clients, of
course, do not pay at all.'4 ° Whereas contingent-fee lawyers extend
credit until litigation ends (with recourse only against proceeds of the
litigation itself), hourly rate lawyers generally extend credit only until
their bill is due (with recourse against the client personally). The
hourly rate lawyer's risk also is a credit risk rather than an insurance
risk; the client is obligated to pay, but perhaps because of losing his
case, the client is unable or unwilling to pay. Because this credit risk
can be substantial, an hourly rate lawyer working without a retainer
may charge more for her services or give fewer discounts, particularly
if the client is a poor credit risk.
139. See Rita H. Jensen, Billing a Client Is Simple; Now, Try to Collect the Money, NAT'L L.J.,




Recently, nonlawyer intermediaries have joined lawyers in ex-
tending credit for legal services. One California company has intro-
duced "Lawcard," a credit card on which clients can charge legal fees.
Lawyers are "guaranteed that [they will] be paid regularly and in full,
minus a service charge" of ten to thirty percent of the total fee. 141 The
service charge is withheld from the lawyer and varies with the client's
"credit rating"-which in turn is based on the client's financial stand-
ing and the type of case. The lawyer for a well-to-do plaintiff in a
patent case might be charged ten percent of her fee whereas the law-
yer for a middle income client seeking a divorce might be charged
thirty percent. 142 A lawyer whose client uses Lawcard might or might
not pass the service charge on to the client in the form of a higher
fee.14
3
A pure credit arrangement (under which a client would ulti-
mately be liable for the full value of legal services), however, does not
accommodate a client's low tolerance for the substantial risks of litiga-
tion. A client incurs risk in allowing her claim to be handled by a
particular lawyer; the client may recover less because of the lawyer's
incompetency, inexperience, or poor judgment. The client thus as-
sumes the risk of finding out ex-post that she chose a lawyer less effec-
tive than another lawyer might have been. Furthermore, there is risk
inherent in litigation itself-almost every claim, no matter how good,
has some chance of being lost or resulting in a low recovery, whether
because of a statute of limitations or other technicality, an unsympa-
thetic jury or judge, or witnesses who collapse under cross examina-
tion. Finally, some claims simply are better than others, and a client
may want to insure against the risk that her claim is a poor one.
The third component of a contingent-fee arrangement meets this
need for insurance because contingent-fee lawyers not only extend
credit, but also share risks with their clients. Just as a merchant or a
credit card company may insure a buyer's purchase against loss or
141. Jan Hoffman, The Credit Card That Pays Legal Bills, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at B7.
Although lawyers usually may accept payment by conventional credit card, legal fees would
exceed many clients' credit lines. Lawcard is a separate credit line for services rendered by a
lawyer approved by the card issuer. Id.
142. Id.
143. Most of the ethical issues involved with Lawcard arise because lawyers act as agents of
the card issuer when giving the Lawcard application to clients who depend upon the lawyers for
disinterested advice. Furthermore, Lawcard could violate prohibitions on lawyers splitting fees
with third parties. For discussion of these prohibitions, see ACLU/Eastern Missouri Fund v.
Miller, 803 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Mo.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 943 (1991) (assignment by lawyers to
ACLU of fee in civil rights lawsuit violated prohibition on lawyers sharing fees with laypersons);
STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETmcs 805 (2d ed.
1995).
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damage, 144 a lawyer may insure a client against the contingency that
legal services will not provide substantial benefit; the insurance pre-
mium is the lawyers' share in the proceeds if the suit is successful and
the payout is a waiver of attorneys' fees if it is not.145 If lawyers were
to sell the insurance component without the credit component (which
almost none do), they would bill clients at higher than normal hourly
fees and agree to reimburse all or part of such fees if recovery were
lower than expected. Instead, almost all contingent-fee lawyers sell
the credit component in addition to the insurance component and
postpone payment during the pendency of litigation.
Such risk sharing by lawyers and clients obviously increases the
likelihood that plaintiffs will prosecute their claims. More cases will
be litigated if legal-cost insurance is available to plaintiffs than if it is
not. This is true even if hourly rate lawyers or other lenders, like Law-
card, advance credit to plaintiffs for costs of litigation; some plaintiffs
simply will not assume the risk of litigating without insurance. It is
obvious why contingent fees are not favored by likely defendants in
lawsuits.
146
B. Competition-Is There or Isn't There?
Bar admission requirements limit the supply of lawyers, and in a
number of contexts lawyers are alleged to use their market power to
violate antitrust laws. 147 Indeed, the practice of law is sometimes de-
144. See infra text accompanying note 175.
145. Contingent-fee arrangements alternatively could be viewed as joint ventures whereby
lawyers, instead of conducting litigation only for clients' benefit, agree with clients to litigate for
their mutual benefit. Clients would contribute their claims to the ventures, and lawyers would
contribute their time, putting both at risk. However, the joint venture paradigm does not square
with legal constructs that currently govern the lawyer-client relationship. Joint venturers owe a
fiduciary duty to each other, see Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928), whereas
fiduciary duties in the lawyer-client relationship go in one direction. See Maksym v. Loesch, 937
F.2d 1237, 1241 (7th Cir. 1991) ("a lawyer is a fiduciary of his client"). Clients do not owe
fiduciary duties to their lawyers, although lawyers do have remedies against their clients for
unpaid fees under the law of contracts or, if the attorney is discharged before performance is
completed, under the law of restitution. "The discharged [contingent-fee] attorney, precluded
from realizing the contingent percentage as contract damages, is, however, entitled to a quantum
meruit recovery." Lester Brickman, Setting the Fee When the Client Discharges a Contingent Fee
Attorney, 41 EMORY L.J. 367, 367 (1992) [hereinafter Brickman, Setting the Fee].
146. Although lobbying by corporate defendants is now focused on proposals to adopt the
English rule, supra note 1, restrictions on contingent fees also are likely to be supported by those
defendants who believe that contingent fees encourage litigation.
147. See Person v. Association of Bar of New York, 414 F. Supp. 133, 134-35 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), rev'd, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977) (challenging restrictions on
lawyer advertising as unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but also
alleging that large law firms dominating defendant bar association enforced such restrictions in
order to prevent individual practitioners from developing business opportunities). On occasion,
state bar associations have imposed minimum fee schedules to restrict discounting of legal serv-
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scribed as a monopoly granted to lawyers by the state.148 However,
law practice is not monopolized by a single provider the way utilities,
railroads, and other industries sometimes are. Lawyers can and do
compete with each other for business. Thus, the mere fact that law-
yers dominate the market for legal services or champerty of litigation
does not necessarily make pricing anticompetitive.
If lawyers compete against each other, they may drive prices
down to competitive levels. Alternatively, lawyers may collude to set
prices at higher than competitive levels149 or litigants may not have
opportunities to compare lawyers and their prices. 50 Thus, a critical
empirical question for most scholarship in this area has been the ex-
tent to which lawyers compete against each other when they price
contingent fees.' 51 This Article does not analyze available empirical
data that has already been exhaustively analyzed by scholars. 152
Rather, this Article discusses three economic models that may explain
peculiarities in the pricing of contingent fees: a model in which sellers
compete primarily with respect to a single variable (quality of service),
a model featuring tie-ins where purchase of one product (legal-cost
insurance) is required to purchase another (legal services), and a price
discrimination model in which sellers charge different amounts for the
same service according to the value that each individual buyer places
on that service. This Article also discusses ways in which each of these
three models differs from a model of perfect competition.
ices. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (fee schedule of state bar associations
fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
148. F.B. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES, A STUDY OF PROFES-
SIONAL ECONOMICS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 9 (1964).
149. For a detailed discussion on resource cartels such as labor monopolies, see JACK HIRSH-
LEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 380-83 (3d ed. 1984); see also Ian Ayres, How Cartels
Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 295 (1987).
150. Lack of competition in the market for legal services has been noticed by courts as well
as commentators. Chief Justice Burger observed in 1986 that, "[iln multiple disaster cases
. the transaction between an experienced lawyer and inexperienced lay survivors in negotiat-
ing a contract for professional services is not an arm's length transaction." Michael Horowitz,
Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY
L.J. 173, 179 n.26 (1995) (citing James H. Rubin, Chief Justice Urges Look at Limits on Lawyer's
Fees, Associated Press News Release, May 13, 1986). Justice O'Connor observed that "it would
be unrealistic to demand that clients bargain for their services in the same arm's-length manner
that may be appropriate when buying an automobile or choosing a dry cleaner." Shapero v.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 489-90 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
151. See KR=IZER, supra note 127; Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15; Clermont &
Currivan, supra note 119; Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119.
152. See KRITZER, supra note 127; Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15.
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1. The Fixed-Variable Competition Model
In a competitive market, different lawyers would charge the same
litigant different amounts for the first product they sell, their services.
A lawyer's expected fee thus would be an amount equal to the market
value of lawyer time that she expected to devote to the litigant's case.
For example, a client should pay a higher fee for a skilled litigator or
settlement negotiator willing to devote substantial time to a case. Al-
ternatively, low opportunity costs often cause less experienced lawyers
to charge less (perhaps by taking a very risky case for a reasonable
contingent fee).
In addition to the fee for services (the underlying fee), a contin-
gent-fee lawyer also charges her client a premium for providing credit
and insurance. This premium equals the amount by which the law-
yer's expected recovery from a case (the total fee) exceeds the under-
lying fee. In deciding what premium she will accept for taking a case
on a contingency, the lawyer might consider factors unique to her
practice such as her ability to diversify against the risk of losing. For
example, cases which require substantial time investment may pose a
level of risk that is unacceptable to solo practitioners and smaller
firms. A lawyer also will take into account compensation disputes
that a fee arrangement may cause within her law firm, a factor often
weighing against larger firms taking cases on a contingency. 153
However, a perfectly competitive market would tend to force
premiums for contingent fees to levels demanded by the lowest-cost
providers. High-cost providers would find market premiums to be
unattractive and switch to working at an hourly rate instead. Thus,
individual tolerance for risk and compensation politics of individual
firms would not affect premiums, and premiums instead would vary
primarily with factors unique to the case at hand: the expected return
on investment of lawyer time and how long a lawyer would have to
wait for that return. Lawyers who stay in the market would charge
similar premiums for financing and insuring similar cases just as, in a
perfectly competitive market for auto insurance, insurers would
charge similar rates to insure the same car and driver.
The total fee (premium plus underlying fee) can be an enhanced
hourly rate, payment of which is contingent on recovery. Alterna-
tively, the total fee can be a percentage of any judgment or settlement
obtained, in which case, two variables, the size and strength of the
153. See infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text.
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claim, determine the premium. Thus, in a competitive market the per-
centage charged should be identical for similar claims (in size and
risk) to which lawyers of similar skill devote similar amounts of time.
Differences in any of these variables should cause variation in the per-
centage charged.
While it is true that variations in these factors could balance each
other out, a competitive market in which fees consistently are the
same percentage of judgment or settlement (for example, thirty-three
percent) would be unusual. Theoretically, it is possible that all law-
yers could charge the same percentages and compete with respect to
the quality of their services (skill and expenditure of time). In this
scenario, the better cases would simply go to the better lawyers. 154 It
is unlikely, however, that perfect, or anything near perfect, competi-
tion among lawyers would settle into such an equilibrium in which
plaintiffs are charged the same percentage fee regardless of the size
and strength of their cases. Indeed, competition only with respect to
quality of service, not price, is characteristic of markets subject to ex-
ternal restraints on competition. Examples include the market for air-
line tickets prior to deregulation of the airlines in the late 1970s' 55 and
the market for stock brokers' commissions prior to abolition of fixed
154. To some extent, there is competition among lawyers, with the better cases going to the
better lawyers. However, it is lawyers, not plaintiffs, who usually benefit from this competition,
because lawyers who try contingent-fee cases often get those cases on referral from other law-
yers. The lawyer who signed up a client and the trial lawyer may negotiate in a competitive
market for different shares. In this scenario, the legal profession allocates within itself the bene-
fits of competition while the plaintiff pays a fee that is often uniform (i.e., thirty-three percent)
regardless of the strength or size of the case.
The Model Code prohibits unaffiliated lawyers from dividing a fee except in proportion to
the work that they actually perform for the client. MODEL CODE DR 2-107(A). The practical
effect of the Model Code restrictions is to prohibit fees for "referral." However, many jurisdic-
tions have chosen the more liberalized approach in Model Rule 1.5(e), which allows a fee divi-
sion so long as "the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer" or "by
written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representa-
tion." As Comment 4 to Rule 1.5 points out, this Rule "permits the lawyers to divide a fee on
either the basis of the proportion of services they render or by agreement between the partici-
pating lawyers if all assume responsibility for the representation as a whole and the client is
advised and does not object." Such an arrangement is used by a lawyer who initiates a contin-
gent fee representation and passes the case on to another lawyer, often more experienced in trial
work, keeping for themselves a "finder's" fee consisting of a percentage of any judgment
obtained.
The liberalized fee-splitting rule in Model Rule 1.5 broadens the range of allowed contrac-
tual arrangements between lawyers and their clients. Allowing a portion of a fee to go to the
lawyer who originates a representation may encourage lawyers to refer cases that can more
competently be handled by other lawyers.
155. For discussion of the single variable quality-focused competition in the airline industry
prior to its deregulation, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 36-82 (1982).
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commissions in 1975.156 In a competitive market, lawyers, like other
suppliers of goods and services, should compete with respect to both
price and quality.
As is often the case, however, the real world does not conform to
the model of perfect competition. As Professor Brickman points out,
"[t]he existence of a standard one-third contingent fee itself indicates
the absence of competitive pricing," particularly where "[t]he likeli-
hood of success in prosecuting personal injury and other claims ranges
from zero to one hundred percent. ' 157 Other evidence that
"[clontingent fee lawyers are charging monopoly rents" 158 includes
the fact that, over a twenty-five-year period, the standard one-third
fee has survived a "doubling of the success rate at trial"'159 and "a very
substantial increase in the average inflation-adjusted tort award.' 160
Furthermore, the historical development of contingent fees has shown
that courts and states, not market forces, have been the predominant
force in fixing prices at their current level. 161 Although lawyers may
compete for the better cases, with less experienced lawyers getting
smaller cases with lower chances of recovery, in a perfectly competi-
tive market lawyers would compete with respect to the percentage
charged as well as quality of service. No one price formula would
predominate the way the one-third contingent fee does today.162
156. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(e), 15 U.S.C. §78f(e) (1994). For discus-
sion of brokerage commissions prior to 1975, see Richard W. Jennings et al., The Decline and
Fall of Fixed Commissions: A Lesson in the Difficulty of Enforcing a Price-Fixing Conspiracy, in
SECURrmEs REGULATION 556-59 (Richard W. Jennings et al., 7th ed. 1992). Growing competi-
tion among brokers led customers to demand give-ups. Id. at 557-58; see also Gregg A. Jarrell,
Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects of Deregulation, 27 J.L. & ECON. 273, 279
(1984).
157. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 106. Professor Brickman points out that
"[c]laims with a very low likelihood of success or a low anticipated return are typically rejected
by lawyers, so that the claims which actually gain legal representation usually reflect success
likelihoods ranging from twenty to one hundred percent." Id. For the cases that are taken,
however, it is also true that "[u]nder competitive conditions the same percentage fee would not
be charged for both [high value and low value] cases." Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119, at
1139-40.
158. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 105.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 106-07. When contingent fees climbed to around fifty percent, statutes and rules
were. used to drive them down. Id. at 107 & n.314 (citing NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE AN-
NUAL 131-32 (1985), which amended the contingent-fee schedule in New York, Judiciary Law
§ 474-a (McKinney 1983)).
162. Professor Brickman also points out that in the one arena in which lawyers bid against
each other, aviation accident cases, contingent fees have dropped from thirty-three percent to
around fifteen to twenty percent. Competition is enhanced because the identities of victims are




2. The Tie-in Model
One way a seller can use market power is to construct a tie-in
between two products. 163 Customers buying the "tying" product,
often find that the "tied" product is overpriced. 164 A tie-in thus can
be used to take advantage of market power and capture more of the
value that a buyer places on a product.165 A tie-in, however, does not
itself give a seller market power; the seller can only charge what buy-
ers will pay for the two products combined. Rather, the tie-in is an
instrument by which a seller who already has market power extracts
higher prices. 166
Thus, in a perfectly competitive market, a tie-in would be useless
as a pricing strategy and would not be used. The tie-in could not ex-
tract consumer surplus because other sellers willing to sell for a
smaller share of consumer surplus would enter the market. Tie-ins
thus are ineffective at raising prices unless there are market aberra-
tions, such as price controls, 167 or market power that allows a seller to
extract a share of consumer surplus. Buyers who do not want the tied
product have ample opportunities to go elsewhere.
For example, because a retailer with substantial sales would pre-
sumably value its leased premises more than a retailer with smaller
sales, many commercial landlords charge rents that are a percentage
of a renter's retail sales. "This tie-in of rent to sales might be a way
for the owner to capture more of the renter's value of the premises,
but it might also be a way of sharing risk in the value of the prem-
ises.' 68 The renter thus buys "leasehold-value insurance" from the
landlord in much the same way a client buys legal-cost insurance from
163. A tie is "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the condition that the
buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that
product from any other supplier." 9 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 4 (1991) (quoting
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)).
164. "In a tie-in, then, the prices of the items are separately meaningless. Only the sum of
the two prices is relevant, and only that is compared to the buyer's total personal valuation for
the two items." ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETI-
TION, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 251 (3d ed. 1983).
165. This value attributed to a good or service by the buyer is represented by the area under
the demand curve showing how much buyers are willing to pay. See id. at 17-18; see also dia-
gram, infra note 187.
166. "Of course, antitrust law is surely concerned with the oppression of buyers that results
from reducing the vitality of competition in either the tied or tying market. However, the inter-
ference with buyer choice, standing alone, is a doubtful ground for objecting to tie-ins."
AREEDA, supra note 163, at 9-10.
167. "During price controls on gasoline, sellers often required that to get gasoline you had to
buy a lube job." The sellers thus "captured more of the value of the gasoline." ALCHIAN &
ALLEN, supra note 164, at 252.
168. Id.
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a contingent-fee lawyer. Whether the risk-sharing arrangement also
allows the owner to capture more of the renter's value of the prem-
ises, however, depends on whether there is a competitive market. If
the market is competitive, the renter with substantial sales can avoid
losing this value by negotiating a more favorable lease elsewhere. The
owner thus could not insist that every renter pay the same percentage
of sales.
Because tie-ins indicate concentrated market power, they can run
afoul of the antitrust laws. 169 However, because tie-ins usually are a
means of using or "leveraging" market power, rather than its source,
antitrust laws generally target the market power rather than the tie-in
itself.170 Furthermore, tie-ins are rarely even acknowledged, much
less contested, in contexts where buyers, and government regulators,
commonly believe that only a single product is being sold.' 71 For ex-
ample, the tie-in often goes unnoticed in the case of a commercial
lease priced so as to effectively require the renter to buy leasehold-
value insurance as well as a lease.
Instead of a mandatory tie-in, a seller may use a nonmandatory
tie-in that gives buyers a choice of whether to buy the second product,
sometimes coupled with some form of coercion 172 or aggressive mar-
keting.1 73 Although the second product may be needed to use or to
pay for the first, such as software for a computer or financing for a car,
in other instances the second product is unnecessary and not even par-
ticularly desirable. Perhaps the most widely known example of a non-
mandatory tie-in is insurance designed to insure against loss, damage,
169. It is unlawful under § 3 of the Clayton Act for any contract for the "sale of goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities" (but not services) to prohibit
dealings with a competitor "where the effect ... may be to substantially lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." AREEDA, supra note 163, at 10 n.21 (quot-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982)).
170. "The original, continuing, and most fundamental concern about tying is 'leverage."' Id.
at 6. "'Leverage' is loosely defined ... as a supplier's power to induce his customer for one
product to buy a second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased solely on the
merit of that second product." Id. (quoting Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2, 14 n.20 (1984)).
171. Professor Areeda identifies "'bundled' products or services," provided by a seller that
"engages in further processing or otherwise performs internally a service that customers might
have purchased from others." Examples include a hospital that denies independent sellers of
goods and services access to the premises, a seller that "bundles installation charges into the
price of a product," and a nursing home that includes the price of meals in a monthly charge. Id.
at 231.
172. Although it is frequently said that "coercion" of some type must be present for a tie to
exist, "a tie may be present without 'coercion' in the lay sense." Id. at 12. For example, a
monopolist may sell a tying product at a lower price to customers who buy a second product. Id.
173. For a discussion of marketing with tie-in sales, see DAVID H. GOWLAND & ANNE R.
PATERSON, MICROECONoMIc ANALYSIS 323-24 (1993).
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or inability to use a product. Buyers of many products, including tele-
vision sets, computers, and cars, are often inundated with requests to
purchase a manufacturer's service warranty. Such warranties are
often overpriced. 174 Credit card companies often aggressively market
"credit insurance" plans to cardholders to insure against setbacks that
could lead to nonpayment of unpaid balances, and these credit-insur-
ance plans generate very high profits for the insurers and the credit
card company.175 However, such high profits would not exist absent
deficiencies in market competition or in consumer information about
the insurance contract and about the need for insurance.
Sellers who have a fiduciary relationship with their buyers are in
a particularly advantageous position to sell a tied product, although
ethical and legal issues arise when a fiduciary relationship is used to
direct a selling effort at the beneficiary. 176 The beneficiary may be led
to believe that he needs the tied product when in fact he does not, or
may be told that one or both products are fairly priced, when in fact
they are not. However, even in the fiduciary context, where a buyer is
likely to believe that the seller is looking after the buyer's own inter-
ests, a market with perfect competition and perfect information will
put buyers on notice. Aggressive selling of unnecessary or overpriced
products simply will not work.
Lawyers utilize a mixture of the mandatory tie-in and the non-
mandatory tie-in when they sell clients legal-cost insurance by way of
a contingent fee. Although lawyers should explain to clients different
payment options, and the more ethical practice is to make payment at
an hourly rate available to clients who can afford to do SO, 1 7 7 it is
common for plaintiffs' lawyers to insist on taking cases on a contin-
174. See Cliff Roth, Is An Extended Warranty Worth the Price?, HOME OFF. COMPUTING,
Nov. 1992, at 32.
175. See Mike Hudson, Viewpoints; Credit Insurance: Overpriced and Oversold, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 1994, § 3, at 8.
176. A lawyer may argue that a fiduciary relationship does not begin until after the lawyer is
formally retained, which usually occurs after her fee is agreed upon. This argument is probably
unfounded. Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 51-53 nn.87-88, 66; see HAZARD, supra
note 116, at 99.
177. See MODEL CODE EC 2-20 ("Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept em-
ployment on a contingent fee basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not
necessarily improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a case, to
enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client who, after being fully informed
of all relevant factors, desires that arrangement."); THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CON-
DUCT ch. 5 cmt. (Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Found., Revised Draft 1982), re-
printed in THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 244 (1994) ("When a contingent fee is proposed by an attorney,
it is desirable, although it is not required, that a reasonable retainer arrangement be offered in
the alternative.").
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gency.178 Even if lawyers do not insist on working on a contingency,
the lawyer-client relationship is particularly prone to aggressive mar-
keting. Clients consult lawyers for advice, and it is all too easy for
advice to be coupled with salesmanship.
Furthermore, the "tied" product, legal-cost insurance, can only be
obtained from the lawyer providing the legal services. Market condi-
tions, created in part by enforcement of the champerty doctrine and in
part by the fact that lawyers may refuse to cooperate with outside
litigation insurers,179 effectively preclude insuring a lawsuit with some-
one other than the lawyer trying the case. Even other lawyers, unless
they assume responsibility for the litigation, cannot advance expenses
in return for participation in the contingent-fee arrangement.
180
It is important to recognize that the tie-in of legal-cost insurance
to legal services is not itself the cause of the client's injury.1 8' A law-
yer's market power may be the cause of injury, and, if so, the lawyer
could use that power to extract consumer surplus from the client
whether or not the tie-in arrangement were available (market power
allows a seller to charge an excessive price for services sold separately
as well as together). However, aggressive use of, and often insistence
on, the tie-in by lawyers suggests that such market power exists and is
being used.l s2
3. The Price Discrimination Model
Because contingent fees usually vary with the size of jury awards
or settlements, lawyers expect to earn more from some cases than
178. "[L]awyers will not normally take a personal injury case on other than a contingent fee
no matter how wealthy the client.... [l]ts use is widespread today because it is so profitable for
lawyers." JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT IN-
SURANCE 48 (1971).
179. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
180. ABA Model Rule 1.5(e) reads:
(e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may be made only
if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by
written agreement with the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for
the representation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the participation of all the law-
yers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.
181. See AREEDA, supra note 163, at 9-10. "Rather than increase or preserve power in any
market, tying can serve instead-and probably more frequently-to exploit power that the de-
fendant already has." Id. at 44.
182. Under perfect competition, lawyers furthermore presumably would have little incentive
to market aggressively the contingent-fee option, as the premium for credit and legal-cost insur-
ance would be competitively priced. Such, however, is not the case, as many personal injury
lawyers insist on working for a contingency and others strongly encourage it. See supra note 178.
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from others. Lawyers' expected returns on their time investment thus
vary depending on the anticipated value of legal services to particular
clients; clients expected to benefit more from legal representation by
winning big judgments are charged more while others are charged
less.
183
Such is price discrimination, a widespread practice whereby pro-
ducers of goods and services extract higher prices from buyers who
value a product more or who can afford to pay more.184 The most
widely known instance of discriminatory pricing is in the airline indus-
try where business travelers, presumably on expense accounts and
traveling on pretax dollars, are charged fares substantially higher than
leisure travelers forced to adhere to rules unacceptable to most busi-
ness travelers (two-week advance purchase, Saturday night stay, etc.).
Another example is pricing by colleges of tuition according to each
admitted student's ability to pay.185 Similar pricing schemes are used
by utilities and entertainment providers.' 86
The power of discriminatory pricing to increase output and reve-
nue in a less than fully competitive market is apparent from compari-
son with a seller who, having some monopoly power, sells to all buyers
at the same price.187 Even if the marginal cost of selling an extra unit
of product is close to zero (as it is for a seat on an airplane already
183. For a discussion of Lester Brickman's research, see supra text accompanying notes 121-
23.
184. AREEDA, supra note 163, at 119.
185. See supra note 49; see also Unprecedented Press Release Attacked MIT, DEP'T JUST.
ALERT, Feb. 7, 1994, at 3; DOJ Defends Handling of Ivy League Case, DEP'T JUST. ALERT, July
1992, at 9 (investigation into collusion in the amount of student aid offered to individual students
at MIT and other Ivy League Schools).
186. Electric utilities charge different rates to low-income, industrial, and residential custom-
ers. Movies, plays, and concerts discriminate in price according to age. S. CHARLES MAURICE
ET AL., supra note 100, at 614-24.
187. The profit maximizing output for a firm with monopoly power is where the marginal
cost curve intersects the marginal revenue curve. For a more detailed discussion, see ARTHUR
THOMPSON, JR., ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 358-64 (5th ed. 1989).
The difference between a nondiscriminating and a discriminating monopolist is shown by
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scheduled to fly), a seller charging a uniform price will not sell the
extra unit if, in order to do so, she must reduce the price on all other
units sold to such an extent that her total revenue decreases on ac-
count of sale of the extra unit (in other words, her marginal revenue
from the unit is negative). If the marginal cost of selling an extra unit
is higher than zero, as is true for a lawyer selling time that could be
devoted to other work or to leisure, the effect of uniform pricing is
even more pronounced: the seller will not sell an extra unit if, taking
into account reduction of prices charged on all other units, total reve-
nue does not increase by more than total costs (in other words, margi-
nal revenue from the extra unit fails to exceed marginal cost). Even if
the seller would have sold the extra unit alone at a price that some
buyer was willing to pay, the seller charging a uniform price will prefer
to let it go unsold.
Discriminatory pricing, on the other hand, allows a lower price to
be charged only to buyers who would not pay a higher price. If other
buyers can still be charged a higher price, the extra unit can be sold at
any price that does not exceed the marginal cost of producing the unit.
Marginal revenue will be increased by revenue from the additional
sale, but not decreased by reduction of the price on all other units
sold. A lawyer using discriminatory pricing, for example, might
charge $80 an hour to a client seeking to recover a few thousand dol-
lars in a slip and fall case, but not charge the same low rate to another
client suing for, and likely to win a million dollar judgment. The latter
client might still be billed at $250 an hour. The lawyer will take the
lower paying client so long as the marginal cost of an additional hour
of the lawyer's time is less than $80.
Instead of charging $80 and $250, two easily distinguishable
hourly rates, the lawyer in the above example could disguise the dif-
ference by using a uniform rate (perhaps $150/hour) coupled with pre-
mium billing 188 of one client and discounts or write-offs of billable
D is the demand curve; MR is the marginal revenue curve; and C is the cost curve, which is
assumed to also describe marginal costs. Under perfect competition, firms would sell output Qi
at price Pi, where D and C intersect. A nondiscriminating monopolist would sell output Qii at
price Pii. A "perfectly discriminating monopolist" would sell Qi at prices ranging from Pi to PH
according to each buyer's position on the demand curve. For a similar diagram and analysis, see
AREEDA, supra note 163, at 124 n.18.
188. Several corporate law firms bill clients by transaction size and results rather than on an
hourly basis. See Designer Billing, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1989, at 38. The Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility actually condone such fees by specifying as a factor to be considered in determin-
ing whether a fee is reasonable, "the amount involved and the results obtained." MODEL RULES
Rule 1.5(a)(4); see MODEL CODE DR 2-106; Committee on Professional Responsibility, Regula-
tion of Contingent Fees, Including Alternative Contingent Fee Arrangements, 45 REc. ASS'N B.
CrrY N.Y. 637, 647-48 (1990).
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hours for the other. Alternatively, the lawyer could use a contingent
fee. Such an arrangement is indeed a perfect device for disguising
discriminatory pricing because both clients may appear to be charged
the same rate (thirty-three percent), whereas the expected hourly rate
(expected recovery x .33 + expected hours) actually could be much
higher for the client with the larger claim than for the client with the
smaller claim. Regardless of whether the discriminatory pricing ap-
pears in a contingent fee or otherwise, the lawyer can accept the lesser
paying client's case whereas, if both clients had to be charged the
same rate, the client only willing to pay $80 an hour might get turned
down.
Apologists for occasional "overcharging" in contingent-fee cases
typically assert that lawyers "undercharge" in other cases.189 Critics
argue that undercharging some clients is no excuse for overcharging
others. 190 These arguments and rebuttals, however, presume that a
significant number of clients are "undercharged," when in fact the dis-
criminatory pricing model suggests that clients are charged what a
lawyer's services are worth to them.191 A lawyer takes some cases for
fees that she expects only to exceed slightly her marginal costs be-
cause she can still charge higher fees to other clients. Charging some
clients less than others-whether directly or through a projected
hourly rate hidden in a contingent fee-allows the lawyer to accept
189. Part of the difficulty of the problem of judging the fairness of the contingent fee
system in personal injury litigation arises from the existence of two different principles
of "fair" pricing. On one hand, if the fee in the individual case is examined according
to the usual methods of measuring the value of legal services, any recovery by the
lawyer over that value is "unfair" ....
On the other hand, when the mass of cases is taken as a whole, the idea of using
overcharges to some clients to offset undercharges to others does not seem an unfair
way to support a system of providing competent legal services to clients who need
them, assuming there is no feasible alternative system.
MACKINNON, supra note 148, at 182.
190. As Professor Brickman points out, "[s]uccess or failure in other cases is irrelevant to the
fiduciary and ethical issues." Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 32 n.5. This overcom-
pensation argument is a variation of "robbing Peter to pay Paul," which "[a]s George Bernard
Shaw noted . . . always meets with the approval of Paul." Lester Brickman & Lawrence A.
Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers Revisited, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1, 36 n.133 (1993) (citing
Thoughts on Business Life, FORBES, Apr. 23, 1984, at 176). Furthermore, the discriminatory
pricing model suggests that Professor Brickman is right that Paul is not another client, but the
lawyer.
191. Unless a lawyer intends to work pro bono, intentional "undercharging" of a client will
not occur regardless of how much money the lawyer makes elsewhere (a profit-seeking lawyer
will not accept a case for which he expects his marginal revenue to be less than his marginal cost
in time and effort). The real issue is whether fiduciary and ethical standards permit a lawyer to
implement a discriminatory pricing strategy that extracts consumer surplus from clients with
larger and stronger claims. Although this question probably can be answered in the affirmative,
such is not the point of this Article; modification of inefficient market conditions that allow such
discriminatory pricing to occur is.
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low-fee cases and still increase her profits. It is true that lawyers
sometimes undercharge (work partially or completely pro bono) by
taking cases even when they expect marginal revenues will not exceed
marginal costs, but even when lawyers do not undercharge, discrimi-
natory pricing allows lawyers to charge lower fees to litigants whose
claims are worth less.
It is important, however, to recognize that in a perfectly competi-
tive market such discriminatory pricing cannot occur. The price
charged to any client would be at or close to the marginal cost of pro-
viding services to that client-a client charged more would simply find
another lawyer. If, in the above example, the marginal cost of a law-
yer's time is eighty dollars an hour, that lawyer will take business from
lawyers of similar skill charging any of their clients more. Thus, ab-
sent some market failure, discriminatory pricing is impossible; a pro-
vider cannot charge more to one group of buyers simply because they
can afford to pay.192
Discriminatory pricing in the market for legal services indicates
that the market is not perfectly competitive. Competition is frustrated
primarily by logistical difficulties with comparison shopping. Further-
more, comparison shopping on the basis of price is particularly diffi-
cult because premiums for credit and legal-cost insurance are
"bundled" with underlying fees into flat percentage fees. 193 Two law-
yers, whether charging the same or a different percentage fee, may be
charging different premiums, or they may be charging different under-
lying fees because they have considerably different legal talents and
intend to do considerably different amounts of work on a case. The
client may have little way of knowing.194 Competitive pressures thus
being limited, discriminatory pricing can increase lawyers' total reve-
nue, and lawyers can implement such a pricing structure by charging
most of their clients the same percentage contingent fee (for example,
thirty-three percent). The value of the lawyer's services to the client,
rather than the marginal cost of those services to the lawyer, is thus
the significant determinant of the lawyer's fees. While this price dis-
crimination does not price legal services beyond clients' ability to pay,
192. If firms in a perfectly competitive market earn excessive profits, then other firms enter
the market until profits decline to normal levels. See THOMPSON, supra note 187, at 275-99.
193. See supra note 171 (Professor Areeda's analysis of bundling in the tie-in context).
194. Indeed, one of the most significant advantages that nonlawyer litigation insurers have
over lawyers is that their rates are far easier to compare (a client only need obtain quotes from
two or more litigation insurers on insuring the same case handled by the same lawyer).
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it does mean that some clients pay more than they would in a more
competitive market.
IV. THE ECONOMICS AND ETHICS OF LAWYER AND NONLAWYER
CHAMPERTY
Apart from whether lawyers take advantage of less than perfect
competition among themselves to overcharge for contingent fees,
there is another issue: whether lawyers are the lowest cost providers
of credit and legal-cost insurance in the first place. Lawcard has al-
ready shown that nonlawyers can efficiently provide credit for legal
services, presumably at lower cost than lawyers themselves would in-
cur. 195 Could the same be true for legal-cost insurance?
The practice of combining the first product a lawyer sells (legal
services) in a package with a second (credit) and a third (legal-cost
insurance) may or may not be more cost-effective than selling these
products separately. An arrangement whereby a single provider sells
the entire package (a lawyer's contingent-fee arrangement) incurs
both costs and benefits for the lawyer, her clients, and society. These
costs and benefits, discussed more completely below, sometimes bal-
ance out so that contingent fees are more beneficial (from the vantage
point of both private and social welfare) than credit and legal-cost
insurance provided by nonlawyers. Sometimes, however, they do not.
A. Costs of Lawyer-Provided Champerty
1. Perverse Incentives Favoring Unethical Conduct
It is no secret that a lawyer paid on a contingency has more incen-
tive to do whatever is needed to obtain a judgment than a lawyer
working at an hourly rate. The Royal Commission on Legal Services,
in rejecting proposals to allow contingent fees in Great Britain,
observed,
[tihe fact that the lawyer has a direct personal interest in the out-
come of the case may lead to undesirable practices including the
construction of evidence, the improper coaching of witnesses, the
use of professionally partisan expert witnesses (especially medical
witnesses), improper examination and cross-examination, ground-
less legal arguments designed to lead the courts into error and com-
petitive touting. 196
195. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
196. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 176-77.
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This parade of horribles is no doubt exaggerated and even includes
some practices, such as using professionally partisan expert witnesses
and touting (aggressive solicitation of clients), that are allowed and
even encouraged in the United States. 197 Nonetheless, a contingent
fee increases a lawyer's monetary reward for any action, whether ethi-
cal or unethical, that increases the size of a client's judgment or settle-
ment.198 Although this monetary reward is counterbalanced by risk of
professional sanction if the lawyer is caught in unethical conduct, a
lawyer will sometimes be tempted to take this risk, even at the ex-
pense of her future reputation. Also, such temptation becomes pro-
portionately greater as the financial stakes in a case increase.
Furthermore, lawyers who bill on a contingency have a perverse
incentive to exploit whatever market power they have to overcharge.
This incentive arises because contingent fees can disguise overcharg-
ing and because comparison shopping by plaintiffs is difficult.199
There are obvious logistical difficulties with obtaining quotes from
several different lawyers, particularly for a plaintiff who has suffered
bodily injury. As already pointed out, it also is difficult to discern
what premium a lawyer is charging for the credit and insurance com-
ponents of a contingent fee and what underlying fee the lawyer is
charging for her services.200 If a lawyer demands a thirty-three per-
cent contingent fee instead of twenty-five percent charged by a lawyer
across the street, is the first lawyer charging more for credit and legal-
cost insurance or more for her services, which may in fact be more
valuable than the services of the lawyer charging less? Because these
products are sold together at a single price, it is difficult conceptually
to unbundle the transaction and discern the price of each.
By contrast, nonlawyer litigation insurance rates are far easier to
compare (a client only need obtain quotes from two or more insurers
on the same case handled by the same lawyer). Although the lawyer
for a client with such third-party legal-cost insurance can still use
whatever market power she has to charge an excessive hourly rate, the
fact that she is doing so will be more obvious both to the client and to
any court or disciplinary authority that reviews her fee.
197. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379, 382, 384 (1977) (striking down
restrictions on lawyer advertising); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975)
(striking down mandated minimum fee schedule).
198. See BOK, supra note 50, at 142.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 193-94.
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2. Perverse Incentives Favoring Litigation and Settlement
Strategies That Do Not Maximize Client Welfare
As pointed out above, the first, and most important, product sold
by lawyers is their own services.201 One hotly debated issue is
whether fees that vary with clients' proceeds from litigation cause law-
yers to do better work than fees based on an hourly rate. Are contin-
gent-fee lawyers' incentives more closely aligned with the interests of
their clients?
Although contingent fees may induce lawyers to work more dili-
gently for clients,202 contingent fees are not a prerequisite for good
lawyering. Many high quality law firms do not work on a contin-
gency,20 3 and lawyers, as repeat players in the litigation arena, have a
significant amount to lose from slacking off, regardless of how they
are paid. Reputation for skills that create value for clients, such as
litigation and negotiation skills, effective interaction with opposing
counsel,204 and veracity, 20 5 determines how much a lawyer can charge
for his services. Indeed, "reputational capital" is the single largest as-
set of many lawyers, 20 6 and such capital will increase or decrease in
value depending on how effectively a lawyer works. For plaintiffs'
lawyers, win-loss records and the size of judgments obtained are prob-
ably the most influential factors determining reputation in the profes-
201. See supra text accompanying note 139.
202. See Walter Olson, Sue City: The Case Against the Contingency Fee, POL'Y REV., Winter
1991, at 46, 49 (paying lawyers on a contingency induces more effort out of them); Saundra
Torry, Area Firms Test the Waters of Value Billing, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 1992, at F5 (Contingent
fees "reward creativity and speed, judgment and performance. Lawyers would share the risk in
legal matters, because they would suffer financially if they failed to do the job in the time origi-
nally allotted.").
203. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 826
n.102 (1992) (citing Alberta I. Cook, Hourly Rates Still the Key, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 7, 1988, at S2
(corporate lawyers bill clients based largely on hourly fee)).
204. Professors Gilson and Mnookin have observed that lawyers' reputations for cooperative
conduct in litigation can translate into benefits for clients and thus for lawyers themselves. Ron-
ald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Be-
tween Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 522-23, 525 (1994).
205. Even lawyers with a reputation for disclosing client misconduct may be more valuable
to their clients when interacting with third parties. Richard W. Painter, Toward A Market for
Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
221, 266-68 (1995).
206. Reputational capital is an asset of other professionals as well. Professors Gilson and
Kraakman have observed that investment bankers' reputations justify much of their fees. Ron-
ald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
549, 619-20 (1984). Accountants and lawyers also sometimes offer their services as "reputational
intermediaries" in the securities markets. Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 60, 61 n.20 (1986).
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sion. With or without contingent fees, hard work will be rewarded by
future clients willing to pay high fees.207
Furthermore, contingent fees in some situations may cause law-
yers' and clients' interests to conflict. Professors Schwartz and Mitch-
ell have developed an economic model demonstrating that "[t]he
contingent fee does not necessarily put the lawyer on the client's side
or automatically lead him to do what the client would desire if the
client could understand the nature of his case and the intricacies of
litigation. ' 20 8 In some situations, a contingent fee may lead lawyers-
who know that each additional hour worked comes at the expense of
work on other cases-to work fewer hours on a case than a fully
knowledgeable client paying an hourly rate would choose to have the
lawyer work.
209
There is also a very real possibility that a lawyer's and her client's
interests will diverge when it comes to settling a case if the lawyer is
working for a contingent fee. Accepting a settlement offer benefits
the lawyer in a way that it does not benefit the client-the settlement
avoids investment by the lawyer of additional time in the case. 210 Al-
ternatively, rejecting a settlement offer may cost both the lawyer and
client a certain recovery, but forces the lawyer alone to increase her
investment in the case.2 11 Particularly where a judgment of some sort
207. The high hourly rates charged by well-regarded lawyers of all types demonstrate this
value of reputation. See Rosemary Olander & Sheryl Nance, Hourly Rates for Partners and
Associates, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 23, 1987, at S10 (listing hourly billing rates for lawyers at large law
firms); Richard C. Reed, It's Time to Think About Billing, LEGAL ECON., Sept. 1987, at 28, 40
(hourly rates reflect expertise, market value, reputation, and experience).
208. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119, at 1126; see also Saul Levmore, Commissions and
Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other
Agents' Rewards, 36 J.L. & ECON. 503, 524 (1993).
209. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119, at 1139; see Daniel J.B. Mitchell & Murray L.
Schwartz, Theoretical Implications of Contingent Legal Fees, 12 Q. REV. ECON. & Bus. 69, 71, 73
(1972). For expansion and refinement of the Schwartz and Mitchell model, see Clermont &
Currivan, supra note 119, at 534 ("[A] lawyer may not have a direct economic incentive to work
the number of hours necessary to maximize the size of his client's net recovery, if any, because to
maximize his own profit the lawyer may have to work a different number of hours."); see also
Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 48; Patricia M. Danzon, Contingent Fees for Per-
sonal Injury Litigation, 14 BELL J. ECON. 213, 213-14, 223 (1983); Jay, supra note 11, at 854
("[T]here comes a point when the marginal return for the lawyer from additional work is not
worth the effort. That moment occurs when the lawyer could devote those additional hours to
some other matter that would earn a greater return."); Stuart S. Nagel, Attorney Time Per Case:
Finding an Optimal Level, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 424, 428-32 (1980).
210. Jay, supra note 11, at 854.
211. Ironically, the better the lawyer, the more powerful is this perverse incentive to settle.
The lawyers' reputations may "suggest that there is a high opportunity cost to their time, which
may correlate inversely with their willingness to put effort into the litigation and hence with the
probability of winning." In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538, 542 n.9 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Wil-
liam J. Link, The Courts and the Market. An Economic Analysis of Contingent Fees in Class-
Action Litigation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 255 (1990).
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is all but certain at trial, the client may have little to lose by litigating.
The lawyer, however, may prefer a quick settlement in order to free
up time for another case and may use pressure tactics to coerce the
client into going along with his decision to settle.212
In different circumstances, a lawyer may go to the opposite ex-
treme and urge a client to reject a settlement offer in order to enhance
her reputation with defendants as a litigator.213 Big wins in high pro-
file cases might induce settlement of future cases on more favorable
terms and also might impress potential future clients. Enhanced
"reputational capital" built up by litigating thus may help the lawyer,
but does little for a client whose case is put at risk in the meantime.
However, a client who does not pay by the hour may be less likely
either to request settlement or to believe that her lawyer is acting self-
ishly in refusing settlement.
Finally, lawyers' cash flows and risk preferences might be radi-
cally different from those of their clients, causing lawyers to prefer
settlement where clients would prefer litigation or vice versa.21 4 Law-
yers litigating on a contingency often have very uneven cash flows 21 5
and thus may prefer settlement, although lawyers with more diversi-
fied portfolios of cases may be more willing to take risks. Impecuni-
ous clients, or clients in need of cash to pay medical bills, will be more
risk averse than clients without money problems. Where lawyers'
cash needs and risk preferences do not match those of their clients,
lawyers may give advice that does not adequately take clients' inter-
ests into account. 21 6
These conflicts of interest spill over from settlement negotiations
into the related, and increasingly important, arena of alternative dis-
212. Such is exactly what is alleged to have occurred in the litigation over the Phillips Petro-
leum disaster in Houston. See supra note 12.
213. JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY 46 (1971). On the defense side, insurance
companies sometimes have similar incentives that diverge from the interests of their insureds.
"It is certainly plausible that a repeatedly litigating insurance company might pursue a different
bargaining strategy to minimize claims costs than would a person defending herself against a
single claim." Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1160 (1990).
214. Jay, supra note 11, at 855.
215. See Susan Beck, Playing the Percentages, AM. LAW., Mar. 1992, at 66; Joel A. Rose,
Factors That Affect Profit, N.Y. L.J., July 7, 1992, at 4. JPC has recognized this problem and
offered to purchase lawyers' interests in contingent fees at a discount while cases are on appeal.
See supra note 36.
216. These lawyer-client agency costs would be reduced the most with a contract under
which the lawyer "purchased" the cause of action from the client by promising a fixed recovery
to the client. See Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119, at 1154; Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and
Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 59 (1979). However,
sale of a cause of action to the lawyer would remove any incentive for the plaintiff to cooperate
with prosecution of the case.
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pute resolution (ADR). Professor Lisa Bernstein has observed that a
contingent-fee lawyer not only "always has an incentive to encourage
his client to settle, '2 17 but, because the value of his services prior to
arbitration will probably be small, also "has a strong incentive to en-
courage his client to accept an arbitration award. ' 218 A lawyer paid at
an hourly rate also has interests that may conflict with his clients' in-
terests, although in the opposite direction; fees from discovery and
trial give him an incentive to encourage a client to litigate.219 These
incentives affect not only advice given to clients, but also affect law-
yers' entire outlook on ADR. In at least one state, a recent study
showed that plaintiffs' lawyers, working mostly for contingency fees,
were strongly in favor of a court-connected ADR program, while de-
fense lawyers, paid by the hour, were strongly against it.220
In at least some circumstances, therefore, the contingent fee can
undermine one of the most fundamental roles of a lawyer, her role as
a fiduciary for a client.22' As a fiduciary, the lawyer is bound to con-
sider her client's interests, not her own, when making decisions about
such things as litigation strategy, settlement, and alternative dispute
resolution.222 Difficulties arise, however, when the way in which a
lawyer acts in matters connected with the fiduciary relationship affects
how much she gets paid or whether she gets paid at all. It is true that
such difficulties also can arise in an hourly billing arrangement (partic-
217. Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Fed-
eral Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 2169, 2195 (1993). As pointed out
above, supra text accompanying note 213, this may not always be the case.
218. Bernstein, supra note 217, at 2195. "In a [jurisdiction mandating non-binding court an-
nexed arbitration (CAA)], the lawyer's pre-arbitration investment will often be low relative to
his expected return if his client accepts the arbitration award." Id. "[T]he fact that an award has
been rendered by third-party representatives of the state may make even the most optimistic
client more likely to accept the arbitration award." Id. at 2195-96.
219. Id. at 2195.
220. Id. at 2196 & n.111 (discussing study of Hawaii lawyers' attitudes toward Hawaii's
mandatory nonbinding CAA program for tort claims under $200,000).
221. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "[f]rom a profession charged with such responsibilities
there must be exacted those qualities of truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite
discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility, that have, throughout the centu-
ries, been compendiously described as 'moral character."' Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (concurring opinion); see also Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 503,
555 (1846) (rule against self-dealing by fiduciaries is based on "great moral obligation"); Mak-
sym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1241 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[A] lawyer is a fiduciary of his client and ...
is presumptively barred from self-dealing at the expense of the person to whom he stands in a
fiduciary relationship.").
222. "When a fiduciary relationship is deemed to exist, . . . courts will . . . [require] the
fiduciary to act with loyalty and skill, in the [beneficiary's] best interests," and the beneficiary of
the relationship cannot waive judicial supervision over the fiduciary's performance. Further-
more, courts restrict self-dealing by the fiduciary, and any consents obtained by the fiduciary
from the beneficiary must be informed and independent. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71
CAL. L. REv. 795, 821-23 & n.83 (1983).
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ularly insofar as there is an incentive to prolong litigation), but diver-
gences between lawyer and client interests can be particularly serious
when a lawyer expects to recover less than the client does from each
additional hour of lawyer time invested in a case. Thus, separating the
fiduciary relationship between a lawyer and client from the contrac-
tual relationship between a litigant and litigation insurer should in
some situations encourage the lawyer's adherence to her fiduciary du-
ties. Loyal adherence to fiduciary duties in turn makes the lawyer's
services more valuable.
3. Perverse Incentives for Opportunistic Conduct by Clients and
Law Firm Partners
Contingent fees can create perverse incentives for opportunistic
conduct both by clients toward their lawyers and by law firm partners
toward each other. First, a client may discover in the midst of litiga-
tion that his case is a lot stronger than he and his lawyer at first be-
lieved and that another lawyer is willing to take the case either for an
hourly fee or for a lower percentage of judgment or settlement.
Although the first lawyer may be winning her bet on the contingency,
the client dismisses her and moves on. As Professor Wolfram cor-
rectly observes, "[tihe rule, which is now recognized in almost every
state... is that a client's discharge of a lawyer ends the lawyer's right
to recover on the contract of employment. '223 Most jurisdictions
award the attorney quantum meruit recovery for the value of her serv-
ices rendered,224 although in some jurisdictions the lawyer and client
may agree that the lawyer shall be paid a contingent percentage fee.225
223. WoLFRAM, supra note 28, at 546. An exception might exist where an attorney is dis-
charged very close to the end of the litigation. See Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 14 (Cal. 1972)
(When the "discharge occurs 'on the courthouse steps,' where the client executes a settlement
obtained after much work by the attorney, the factors involved in a determination of reasonable-
ness would certainly justify a finding that the entire fee was the reasonable value of the attor-
ney's services.").
224. WOLFRAM, supra note 28, at 546. This rule can be unfair to a client who discharges a
contingent-fee attorney. Brickman, Setting the Fee, supra note 145, at 368 (recommending that
clients who employ an attorney under a contingent-fee arrangement not be forced to pay a quan-
tum meruit fee upon discharge of the attorney unless the suit succeeds).
225. Under New York law,
[w]hen a client discharges an attorney without cause, the attorney is entitled to recover
compensation from the client measured by the fair and reasonable value of the services
rendered whether that be more or less than the amount provided in the contract or
retainer agreement.... As between them, either can require that the compensation be
a fixed dollar amount determined at the time of discharge on the basis of quantum
meruit.... Or, in the alternative, they may agree that the attorney, in lieu of a pres-
ently fixed dollar amount, will receive a contingent percentage fee determined either at
the time of substitution or at the conclusion of the case.
Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570, 572 (N.Y. 1989) (citations omitted).
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In any event, the lawyer is likely to be paid less than she would have
been if she had completed the representation.
Second, a lawyer may act opportunistically toward her partners
by leaving her firm and encouraging one or more contingent-fee cli-
ents to follow. The temptation for a lawyer to do so is particularly
high when it becomes obvious that a case is likely to result in a sub-
stantial judgment or settlement. This problem is complicated by rules
of professional conduct that allow clients to hire and fire lawyers at
their will, regardless of previous contractual arrangements with a
firm.226 As Professor Hillman observes, ethical rules can act as "aids
to grabbing and leaving. '227
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen228 illustrates just the type
of opportunistic conduct most feared by lawyers when their partners
are working on a contingency. Cohen and Riorden, two partners in a
law firm with seventeen partners, spent five years working for Recti-
fier Corporation, the plaintiff in a major antitrust case. Rectifier was
to pay the firm a contingent fee of one-third of recovery. Cohen and
Riorden earned very little by way of fees for the firm during those five
years, yet were paid their shares of the firm's profits under the part-
nership agreement. Then, as the antitrust case neared settlement, Co-
hen and Riorden demanded to be paid double their share of profits
from the antitrust suit. When the other partners refused, Cohen and
Riorden resigned and formed a new firm. They asked Rectifier to fire
their old firm and instead hire the new firm, which would take the
case for a reduced 83/4% contingent fee. One year later, the litigation
settled for $33 million.229
The court observed that Cohen and Riorden had breached their
duty to their partners both in wrongfully dissolving the old firm and in
failing to complete Rectifier's case for the dissolved firm.230 Nonethe-
less, the court also observed that Rectifier had the right to terminate
its contract with the old firm and to hire the new one. 231 This case is
important not for its result, which in the end curtailed Cohen's and
Riorden's opportunistic conduct, but as an illustration of the difficul-
226. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(a)(3) (providing that a lawyer shall not represent a client
and shall withdraw from a representation that has commenced, if the lawyer is discharged by the
client); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(B)(4); RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 44(1)
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992) ("A client may discharge a lawyer at any time.").
227. ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 2.3 (1994).
228. 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Ct. App. 1983).
229. Id. at 184-86.
230. Id. at 191.
231. Id. at 185.
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ties that confront a firm that tries to control grabbing and leaving.
Ethical rules prohibit the most obvious method of controlling such
conduct, an agreement whereby the client agrees not to change law-
yers.2 32 Furthermore, fiduciary duties under a partnership agreement
turn on facts specific to each case, making it difficult for either party
to obtain summary judgment.
Most courts seek to discourage such opportunism by interpreting
the Uniform Partnership Act, as the Court of Appeals of California
did in Jewel v. Boxer,233 to require that
attorneys' fees received on cases in progress upon dissolution of a
law partnership are to be shared by the former partners according
to their right to fees in the former partnership, regardless of which
former partner provides legal services in the case after the dissolu-
tion. The fact that the client substitutes one of the former partners
as attorney of record in place of the former partnership does not
affect this result.234
Unfortunately, such a rule is not always easy to apply. Jewel involved
a four-partner firm that split into two two-partner firms. What if a
client instead were to dismiss a law firm from a contingency case and
substitute another firm consisting of one of the former partners of the
old firm and several other lawyers not associated with the old firm?
Treating the contingency case as the unfinished business of the old
firm clearly would not make sense if lawyers in the new firm, who had
no association with the old firm, do a significant amount of work on
the case. The client, after all, retains the right to discharge her lawyers
and hire new lawyers of her own choosing, and precluding the new
firm from a share of the contingency clearly would interfere with her
right to do so. Scenarios such as this one create uncertainty, and un-
certainty in turn creates fertile ground for both lawyer and client
opportunism.
Incentives to act opportunistically grow with the size of the case
involved. It is the rare personal injury case that will make it worth-
while for a lawyer to leave his partners (often in a bitter separation),
even if the lawyer can get away with it. Larger cases, however, pres-
ent greater temptation. Furthermore, incentives to grab and leave in-
tensify at larger firms where successful contingent-fee lawyers must
232. See supra note 226.
233. 203 Cal. Rptr. 13 (Ct. App. 1984).
234. Id. at 15; accord Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582, 588 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)
(Although a client has the right to choose her own attorney, this does not mean "that the fees
thereafter earned by the partner chosen by the client are not subject to division in accordance
with the partnership agreement.").
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share the fruits of their victories with more partners. Intrafirm oppor-
tunism is probably a very significant reason why many large firms do
not accept cases on a contingency.
The risk of opportunism in all of these scenarios, and the inade-
quate measures the law applies to deal with it, make contingent fees
all the more contingent. Lawyers will charge higher premiums for
contingency cases not only because of risk that a case will be lost, but
also because of risk that a client may use his right to discharge the
lawyer to cheat her out of her share. 235 Likewise, law firms will
charge higher premiums for contingency cases or refuse to take such
cases at all, because the contingency exposes the firm not only to op-
portunistic clients, but also to opportunistic partners who grab and
leave. Finally, even absent client or lawyer opportunism, a client's de-
cision to change lawyers in a contingent-fee case is bound to create
disputes between incoming and outgoing attorneys over the proper
fee to be awarded to each.236 The anticipated cost of such disputes
and their uncertain outcome is likely to be factored into the premium
charged for the contingency.
Although the relationship between a litigation insurer and a liti-
gant is prone to its own brand of opportunism and agency costs, 2 37
there are significant advantages to separating the insurance compo-
nent of a contingent fee from the underlying fee for legal services.
While there are good policy reasons for preserving a litigant's right to
hire and fire counsel at her choosing, there are no such policy reasons
for failing to enforce a contract between a litigant and a litigation in-
surer. Once the insurer has paid an advance or assumed a potential
liability in return for a percentage of proceeds from litigation, absent
fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the insurer, the litigant
should be required to pay over the specified percentage of the pro-
ceeds upon conclusion of the case. Although the litigant should be
free to bargain with other insurers for future advances, there would be
no such thing as "firing" an insurer and requiring it to accept, instead
of the agreed upon percentage, a quantum meruit recovery (probably
a meaningless term when applied to an insurance premium). Separat-
ing the fiduciary relationship of lawyer and client from the contractual
235. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 389, at 19
(1994) ("The lawyer is also being compensated for the risk she assumes that the client will fire
the lawyer, a right the client might exercise at any time.") (citing Covington v. Rhodes, 247
S.E.2d 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978); Hiscott & Robinson v. King, 626 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993); MODEL CODE DR 2-110(B)(4); MODEL RULES Rule 1.16(a)(3) cmt.).
236. See Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570, 571 (N.Y. 1989).
237. See infra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
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relationship between litigant and insurer creates certainty in the latter.
Certainty helps control opportunism and thus lowers the cost of the
insurance.
4. Costs from Poor Risk Diversification
Much of the rhetoric justifying lawyers' high incomes from con-
tingent fees points to the risks they assume. 238 As Justice Blackmun
observed, "lawyers charge a premium when their entire fee is contin-
gent on winning .... The premium added for contingency compen-
sates for the risk of nonpayment if the suit does not succeed. '239
Lawyers investing time and effort in litigation, like other investors,
thus adhere to a basic precept of portfolio theory: higher risk requires
higher return.240 Most investors are risk averse, and, if the return that
they actually realize from an investment is likely to deviate signifi-
cantly from their expected return, they will demand ex-ante a higher
expected return. In exchange for risking loss of their investment, they
expect to make more. In like manner, many lawyers working on a
contingency demand an expected return241 higher than what they
would demand from working on an hourly basis.242
Much of the debate over contingent fees centers on exactly how
much risk lawyers incur when they take a case on a contingency. Pro-
fessor Brickman and others contend that risk premiums charged are
often excessive relative to the amount of risk that lawyers incur.243
The plaintiffs' bar, and some academic commentators, insist that the
risks lawyers incur are substantial and as a result they deserve to be
well compensated. 2 " Inherent in this debate is the assumption that
238. "While some personal injury awards are large, there's never a guarantee of success in
front of a judge or jury.. . . The [Brickman Proposal] chooses to ignore cases in which the
lawyer walks away without a dime after having invested considerable time, staff and money
preparing the case." Peskin, supra note 19, at A28.
239. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 735-36
(1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting on other grounds).
240. See RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN INTRODUCnON TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON
STOCKS 42-46, 48-54, 114-31 (1969); Franco Modigliani & Gerald A. Pogue, An Introduction to
Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence, 30 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 68 (1964).
241. Expected return is the sum of all possible returns weighted by the probability that they
will occur. For a lawsuit with a 90% chance of a $100 return and a 10% chance of no return, the
expected return would be .90 x $100 + .10 x $0 = $90. For a lawyer working on a 33.3% contin-
gency, the expected return from this lawsuit would be $30.
242. Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119, at 1150.
243. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15, at 31-32.
244. "[T]he size of the [contingent] fee is designed to be greater than the reasonable value of
the services in the individual case, the difference reflecting the fact that the lawyer will realize no
return for his investment of time and office expenses in the cases he loses." MACKINNON, supra
note 148, at 28. "[T]he contingent fee is directly related to and reflects the highly 'contingent'
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investors in a portfolio, including lawyers investing in lawsuits, will
receive a higher return in a competitive market when they incur
higher risk.24
5
However, portfolio theory does not attribute a higher return to
all types of risk. Some risk, known as unsystematic risk, is easily
avoidable through diversification. 246 For example, there is a risk that
fuel prices might go up and adversely affect the stock of an airline, but
such risk is not systematic to the stock market as a whole-some
stocks, perhaps stocks in oil companies, will go up because of the same
contingency. Such unsystematic risk can be diversified by choosing a
variety of investments.247 An investor cannot demand, and an effi-
cient market will not give, a higher expected return on account of this
unsystematic risk that can so easily be eliminated. Other risk, known
in portfolio theory as systematic or beta risk,248 is characteristic not of
particular companies but of the market as a whole. Risk of a down-
turn in the economy, for example, is difficult to diversify away because
it will affect most or all investments. The Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) predicts that the expected return on an investment should
vary with the investment's beta, or its sensitivity to systematic risk af-
fecting the market as a whole. Unsystematic risk, because it can be
diversified away, is presumed to have little or no effect on expected
return. 249
Turning from the efficient markets of the CAPM to the much less
efficient market for investment in litigation, it appears that most of the
risks of litigation are unsystematic. Unforeseen developments that
adversely affect a lawsuit are usually specific to the particular lawsuit
involved, or at most the subject matter of the lawsuit, and are not
likely to affect the outcome of other litigation not closely related in
the parties or subject matter. The fact that one plaintiff cracks up on
the witness stand and admits that he drove his Ford Pinto at 50 mph
into a brick wall before the gas tank exploded does not mean that
another plaintiff will testify so poorly. Even developments affecting a
nature of the claim itself." Kenneth B. Hughes, The Contingent Fee Contract in Massachusetts,
43 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11 (1963).
245. Professor Kritzer uses portfolio theory to analyze contingent-fee arrangements. See
KRITZER, supra note 127, at 7-9.
246. See Modigliani & Pogue, supra note 240, at 76.
247. See RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 119-
26, 140-50 (2d ed. 1984); BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DowN WALL STREET, IN-
CLUDING A LIFE-CYCLE GUIDE TO PERSONAL INVESTING 223-27 (1990); Modigliani & Pogue,
supra note 240, at 76.
248. MALKIEL, supra note 247, at 229.
249. Id. at 231.
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
whole class of plaintiffs, such as new evidence showing that Pintos ac-
tually had safer gas tanks than other models built at the same time,
will not affect litigation brought on behalf of other plaintiffs, such as
users of the Dalkon Shield. Some risks, perhaps the risk that an-
tiplaintiff judges will be appointed or that legislatures will pass bills
hostile to plaintiffs,250 do affect a wide range of litigation, but these
systematic risks (risks that affect the entire litigation system) are few
relative to the unsystematic risks inherent to each case.
The point is that persons who assume risks associated with litiga-
tion can, if they have a diverse enough portfolio of cases, eliminate
much of this risk. The problem for the average trial lawyer is that
such diversification is difficult to achieve.251 While many cases may be
brought into a law office, most take up relatively little time, and are
usually settled for relatively low amounts. A handful of cases may
absorb most of a lawyer's time, and wins or losses in these "big" cases
can have a substantial effect on the lawyer's income.252 Lawyers
working in large firms, if partners split fees regardless of individual
wins or losses, can more easily diversify than lawyers working in small
firms.253 However, profit distribution schemes that allow partners to
"eat what they kill," and the tendency of large firms to sink even more
time and money into even larger cases, undermine diversification.
Furthermore, bringing contingent-fee litigation into a large firm is not
without its own risks to the firm's internal stability.254
Lawyers thus incur unsystematic risks in contingent-fee litigation
that, for them, are more theoretically than realistically diversifiable.
For bearing these risks, lawyers demand compensation. 255 Where the
250. For example, see the litigation reform legislation cited in supra note 1.
251. Professor Coffee uses portfolio theory to explain how plaintiffs' counsel may be better
diversified and therefore less risk averse than defendants or defense counsel. John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private En-
forcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 704-12 (1986).
"[T]he 'diversified' plaintiff's attorney should behave like a risk neutral investor . I. " d. at 705.
Professor Coffee also observes that "[i]n reality, however, matters may not be as simple as the
foregoing theoretical analysis suggests" and that on account of the small size of most plaintiffs'
law firms "it is doubtful that plaintiff's attorneys can achieve full diversification." Id. at 705-06.
252. Peter Blackman, Until the Ship Comes In: Plaintiffs Bar's Solutions to Keep Practices
Afloat, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 9, 1993, at 5; Larry Lempert, Milberg Weiss Class Actions Feed Growth,
LEGAL TIMEs, May 2, 1983, at 1.
253. Professors Schwartz and Mitchell suggest that "[a] lawyer working with a larger practice
would be in a position analogous to an insurance company. He could pool the risks of his many
cases so his income stream over the year would be relatively smooth, despite unexpected out-
comes in particular cases." Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119, at 1150-51.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 226-37.
255. Lawyers who do not take enough cases to become relatively indifferent to risk will "re-
quire a risk premium (an extra margin of expected profit) to handle personal-injury cases."
Schwartz & Mitchell, supra note 119, at 1153. Professors Schwartz and Mitchell point out that,
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market for legal-cost insurance, whether by operation of the cham-
perty doctrine 256 or otherwise, excludes providers-such as institu-
tional investors 257-who could diversify a portfolio of lawsuits more
easily than lawyers, lawyers will demand, and collect, a premium for at
least some of their unsystematic risks. For this same reason, if more
efficient risk diversifiers could enter the market for legal-cost insur-
ance, some lawyers probably would be forced to lower their risk pre-
miums or switch to billing by the hour instead.
The appearance of Lawcard mentioned earlier 258 is explained by
just this phenomenon-Lawcard's issuer is a better diversifier of the
risk associated with financing legal fees than most individual lawyers.
Lawyers, therefore, pay the issuer to assume the risk of nonpayment.
Theoretically at least, legal-cost insurance as well as litigation financ-
ing could be sold to clients in much the same manner. In return for a
higher service charge, probably a share of the proceeds from a lawsuit,
Lawcard's issuer could agree to extend credit to the client with re-
course only against the lawsuit itself. Selling such legal-cost insurance,
however, might cause Lawcard to run afoul of champerty laws in at
least some jurisdictions.259
Thus, regardless of where one comes down in the debate over
whether lawyers are overcharging for risks they incur in contingent
fees,260 lawyers incur more risk than would more effective risk diver-
sifiers. Lawyers who charge for unsystematic risk they incur-and
much of the risk in contingent-fee litigation is unsystematic 261-
charge more than they would receive if more effective diversifiers
were allowed to compete in the market.
B. Benefits of Lawyer-Provided Champerty
The critical issue considered in this Article is whether market par-
ticipants other than lawyers can be effective competitors in financing
and insuring lawsuits on a contingent basis. There are some benefits
to financing and insuring litigation with lawyers instead of nonlawyers,
"[iln a competitive world lawyers who were indifferent toward risk might underbid risk-averting
lawyers," id., but few, if any, personal injury lawyers have enough cases to be indifferent to risk.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 62-89.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
258. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 62-89. But see discussion of JPC, supra note 36.
260. See Brickman, Contingent Fees, supra note 15 (arguing that lawyers often do overcharge
relative to the risk they incur); supra text accompanying notes 121-30.
261. See supra text accompanying note 250.
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and these benefits are more important in the context of some legal
representations than in others.
1. Lower Information Costs
Anyone insuring lawsuits against loss or low recovery will incur
costs of acquiring, processing, and verifying information about under-
lying claims before making an investment decision. It is here that
economies of scope262 give lawyers an advantage over third parties.
Lawyers already evaluate cases to prepare for litigation and are un-
likely to incur substantial additional costs evaluating cases to set con-
tingent fees. On the other hand, third-party litigation insurers must
duplicate investigative work already done by the lawyers whose fees
they are paying.
The amount of investigative work required to fix terms for legal-
cost insurance, whether a contingent fee or third-party insurance, will
depend on the particular case. Because a lawyer working on a contin-
gency usually charges a standard percentage rate,263 the investment
decision made by the lawyer in most situations is whether to accept or
reject a case. Occasionally, the lawyer also will consider adjusting
(usually upwards) his customary percentage fee. A lawyer working on
a contingency, however, usually reaches a fee agreement with a client
quite early in a representation, often after spending only a few hours
evaluating the facts of a case and possibly researching some relevant
legal issues. Presumably, at a cost of a few hours of their time, third-
party litigation insurers with sufficient legal expertise could do the
same thing if given similar access to client information.
264
A more difficult decision is how much lawyer time should be in-
vested in a case. Although lawyers working on a contingency have an
ethical obligation to represent their clients zealously, 265 the fact is that
they exercise wide discretion over litigation strategies (such as discov-
ery requests and motions) that directly determine the extent of their
investment. Other decisions, such as whether or not to settle, are
made by the client after consultation with the lawyer.266 Lawyers
262. "Economies of scope reflect the reduction in production costs that result from the joint
production of a number of different products." See Gilson, supra note 54, at 298.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
264. Litigation insurers, like other persons auxiliary to a case, would have to be included in
the circle of persons entitled to confidential client information without destroying the attorney-
client privilege. See infra text accompanying note 295.
265. MODEL CODE Canon 7.
266. For discussion of conflicts of interest that can arise in this context, see supra text accom-
panying notes 210-16.
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have an advantage over third-party litigation insurers in that informa-
tion already acquired by the lawyer in the course of trial preparation
and trial itself can be used to make these decisions as well.
Third-party legal-cost insurance shifts the locus of these invest-
ment decisions from the litigant and lawyer to the litigant and litiga-
tion insurer. The insurer probably would negotiate with the litigant
for advances toward legal costs at different stages of the litigation. For
example, a litigation insurer might agree to fund a plaintiff's first
$10,000 in legal fees in return for 8% of a judgment or settlement;
when that money runs out, the client would have to bargain away
more of the judgment (perhaps another 8%) for the next $10,000, and
so on.267 Later rounds of financing could come from the same or a
different litigation insurer (the shrewd litigant probably at each stage
would get a quote from at least two). 268 In order to make each invest-
ment decision, a litigation insurer would have to get up to speed on
the case and its chances for success. The insurer thus would have to
learn for itself everything the lawyer already knows from preparing
and trying the case.
It is, however, conceivable that third-party litigation insurers
could rely instead on the lawyers themselves for the relevant informa-
tion. Information provided by lawyers to insurers is likely to be relia-
ble so long as lawyers and insurers have ongoing working
relationships with each other. Because both insurers and lawyers
would be repeat players in this game,2 69 lawyers who convey overly
267. Alternatively, the plaintiff could give the insurer a fiat amount from any judgment. For
the discussion of the JPC's arrangement to purchase an interest in judgments on appeal, see
supra note 36. The arrangement might or might not give the insurer control of the litigation,
which would allow the insurer to decide how much to spend on legal fees. Most defendants have
just such an arrangement with their own insurers whereby the insurer pays legal fees and has
control over the litigation. See Syverud, supra note 213, at 1118-19. Courts address the agency
problems that arise in such arrangements by imposing liability on insurers that unreasonably
refuse to settle a case within the limits of a policy. Id. at 1120-26. On the plaintiff's side, agency
costs also arise in the settlement context if a lawyer works for a contingent fee. See supra text
accompanying notes 210-16.
268. If the case is going well, both the litigant and the litigation insurer will have an incentive
to continue, making it more likely that they will each negotiate the next round of financing in
good faith. The litigant can always control opportunistic behavior on the part of the insurer by
going to another insurer for the next round of financing. It is true that the litigant could behave
opportunistically toward the insurer by threatening to withdraw the case unless the insurer fi-
nances the next round at an artificially low contingency rate. However, such behavior is easy to
control; once an insurer shows a willingness to drop such a case at a loss, few if any litigants will
try the same strategy in the future.
269. David Kreps's work illustrates how game theory "suggests ways in which promises and
threats are credible, because the promise-maker stakes his or her reputation on fulfillment."
DAVID M. KREPs, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELING 65 (1990). In the context of a
cooperative relationship between a lawyer and litigation insurer, the lawyer promises an honest
and complete evaluation of cases to the insurer, and the insurer threatens not to insure future
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optimistic factual or legal evaluations of cases to insurers in order to
obtain fee advances for clients would not have their fees financed and
insured at favorable rates in the future. Indeed, litigation insurers
might keep track of how much money they have won or lost insuring
cases tried by particular lawyers and adjust their rates accordingly. In-
surance for litigation would be priced according to not only the law-
yer's trial and negotiation skills, but also a lawyer's thoroughness and
integrity in conveying information about cases to litigation insurers.
Lawyers, as repeat players representing clients who buy legal-cost in-
surance, thus would have a powerful incentive to represent facts accu-
rately to their clients' chosen insurers.
Indeed, lawyers and insurers play exactly this type of game al-
ready, although, instead of working for plaintiffs, these lawyers and
insurers work for defendants. Liability insurers have perfected the ac-
quisition and verification of information about contingencies to an ex-
act science.2 70 When catastrophe hits, acquisition and verification of
information about litigation contingencies is also a well-practiced
art.2 71 Insured defendants often are represented by lawyers chosen by
the insurer, and these lawyers know that they must not only try their
cases well, but also convey accurate information and advice to the in-
surer that in turn must make intelligent decisions about trial strategy
and settlement negotiations. Lawyers who give poor advice in such
cases handled by that lawyer, or to raise its rates for such cases, if the lawyer's promise turns out
not to be credible (information provided by the lawyer is consistently wrong and errs against the
insurer).
270. Insurance companies often protect themselves from reliance on false information by
verifying facts, such as an insured's driving record, and by contracting to nullify or reduce the
payout on an insurance policy in the event an insured's representations are incorrect. A litiga-
tion insurer could similarly conduct its own investigation of facts and also could insist on contrac-
tual provisions that increase the price of the insurance or deny coverage if statements made by a
litigant or his lawyer prove to be false.
271. Although a defendant insurance company might value the case by multiplying the prob-
able verdict, should plaintiff win, by the probability of a plaintiff's victory, many insurers will use
the more detailed approach described by Professor Syverud:
A defendant whose lawyer has attended a seminar on litigation risk analysis might em-
ploy a more sophisticated technique, such as a decision tree that identifies key uncer-
tainties at trial ("will our expert be impeached?"; "will their 'smoking gun' document
be admitted?"). The defendant will assign conditional probabilities to the outcomes of
each of these events and identify the damages that probably will follow from each out-
come. The defendant then will assign a probability to each of the resulting possible
verdicts. The value of the case (the "expected judgment") is simply the weighted sum
of these discrete verdicts, with the weight for each verdict being its probability.
Kent D. Syverud, Toward a Workable Duty to Settle for Liability Insurers: A Reply, 77 VA. L.
REV. 1597, 1597-98 (1991); see also Marc B. Victor, The Proper Use of Decision Analysis to Assist
Litigation Strategy, 40 Bus. LAw. 617 (1985); Marc B. Victor, How Much is a Case Worth?,
TRIAL, July 1984, at 48.
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regard or who mislead the insurer in order to bill more hours are not
likely to work for the same insurer for very long.
In like manner, plaintiffs' litigation insurers could minimize their
costs of information acquisition and verification by obtaining informa-
tion from plaintiffs' lawyers. Nonetheless, in some legal representa-
tions, litigation insurers would have to do significant due diligence of
their own before making an investment. If so, it may be cheaper for
the client to finance and insure the litigation with his own lawyer by
paying a contingent fee.
2. Avoidance of Agency Costs
Financing and insuring litigation through a third party may in-
crease agency costs because the lawyer-client agency relationship
272
has been complicated by the presence of the third party. In some situ-
ations, financing and insuring with the lawyer thus may simplify the
relationship and keep agency costs low. In other situations, however,
the third-party litigation insurer may actually reduce agency costs by
monitoring the lawyer's performance. 273
A third-party litigation insurer must be privy to, and trusted with,
client secrets and confidences. Although in most scenarios it would be
unlikely that a litigation insurer would use or improperly disclose a
client's confidential information, such conduct is always possible. Liti-
gation insurers who disclose or misuse information would expose
themselves to substantial liability and also are likely to acquire a bad
reputation among the plaintiffs' bar that would significantly diminish
any future business they might have.
Nonetheless, the potential for abuse is sufficient to justify con-
cerns about using liability insurance companies as litigation insurers
for plaintiffs. Obviously, the same insurance company could not be
allowed to have an interest on both sides of a case. However, even a
different insurance company might be tempted to "trade" information
about a plaintiff's case in return for similar information from the de-
fendant's insurer about another case. The risk of insurers colluding to
272. A lawyer is her client's agent. See MODEL RuLEs pmbl. The Supreme Court describes
lawyers "as trusted agents of their clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solu-
tion .... " Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1987) (citing Cohen v. Hurley,
366 U.S. 117, 124 (1961)). The Court elsewhere has emphasized the importance of a lawyer's
"honored and traditional role as an authorized but independent agent acting to vindicate the
legal rights of a client." In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973).
273. Increasingly, clients look to consultants to assist them in monitoring and evaluating
their lawyers' billing practices and litigation strategies. Amy Stevens, Six Ways to Rein in Run-
away Legal Bills, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 1995, at B1, B10.
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manipulate settlement negotiations and even the litigation itself is sig-
nificant if a relatively small group of insurance companies is given a
critical role on both sides of tort litigation. For this reason, while it is
true that economies of scope 274 may make liability insurance compa-
nies cost-effective insurers of plaintiffs' litigation, the potential con-
flicts are probably too great.
Finally, there is the risk that a litigation insurer and lawyer to-
gether could collude to act opportunistically toward the lawyer's cli-
ent. As pointed out above, many litigation insurers will have ongoing
relationships with plaintiffs' lawyers. 275 Such relationships may con-
flict with a lawyer's primary duty of loyalty to her client. For example,
the lawyer could steer a client's business toward a particular insurer in
return for a kickback. Moreover, the lawyer and insurer could collude
to push for settlement of litigation that should go forward in order to
get the insurer quick collection of its premium. Alternatively, the law-
yer and insurer might push to litigate a case because the insurer can
diversify against unsystematic risk, although the client cannot.276
These potential conflicts of interest can translate into significant
agency costs for the client, but should be viewed in perspective; many
of these same conflicts already exist between contingent-fee lawyers
and their clients.277
Indeed, the presence of a third-party litigation insurer may miti-
gate rather than exacerbate agency costs in the lawyer-client relation-
ship. In today's litigation environment, many plaintiffs are at a
disadvantage because they must enter agency relationships with law-
yers without the advantage of being repeat players.278 Unlike defend-
ants or defendants' insurers, plaintiffs do not have incentives to
accumulate information about lawyers' trial preparation, perform-
ance, integrity, and good judgment. Because third-party litigation in-
surers, as repeat players, have incentives to acquire this information
and to signal such information to plaintiffs by pricing legal-cost insur-
274. See supra note 54.
275. See supra text accompanying note 269.
276. For discussion of systematic and unsystematic risk and diversification, see supra text
accompanying notes 246-54. Insurers' greater tolerance for risk than their insureds is one reason
for a plaintiff not to turn control of litigation over to an insurer.
277. For discussion of conflicts of interest between lawyers and clients in a contingent-fee
arrangement, see supra text accompanying notes 208-20.
278. Some plaintiffs, of course, are repeat players. See Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. 77z-1 (a)(3)(B)(iv) (West Supp. 1996) (amending § 21 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u (1994) to add the section "(I) Restrictions on Professional
Plaintiffs").
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ance accordingly, their presence actually may decrease the likelihood
that a plaintiff's lawyer will act opportunistically toward his client.279
V. NURTURING AN EFFICIENT MARKET FOR LEGAL-COST
INSURANCE
A. Abolition of the Champerty Doctrine
As pointed out above, the champerty doctrine and related
prohibitions on maintenance, barratry, and assignment of claims, are
enforced in some jurisdictions but not in others. Often, they are en-
forced sporadically. 280 It is time for these doctrines to be abolished, at
least insofar as they interfere with plaintiffs' ability to insure against
fruitless expenditure on litigation. While there might still be public
policy reasons for not allowing assignment of all or part of a claim for
a cash payment to the assignor,281 there are equally strong policy rea-
sons for allowing a plaintiff to assign a portion of his claim as a pre-
mium for legal-cost insurance. Forbidding this option forces the
plaintiff to buy such insurance from a single provider, his own lawyer,
in a market that may not come close to perfect competition.282
B. Inclusion of Liability for Opposing Counsel's Fees in Lawyer-
Provided Legal-Cost Insurance
With the increasing political pressure to adopt an English-style
loser-pays rule in many jurisdictions283 and the already significant
number of circumstances in which plaintiffs already can be held liable
for successful defendants' fees,284 plaintiffs may soon require inclusion
of such liability in legal-cost insurance, including that provided by
their own lawyers' charging contingent fees. Would plaintiffs' lawyers
be ready to respond?
Several rules of professional conduct would need to be revised to
allow contingent-fee arrangements to include insurance against liabil-
ity under an English-type rule. The first of these is Model Rule 1.8,
which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not provide financial assistance
279. There is also a small risk of opportunism directed by the plaintiffs lawyer at the litiga-
tion insurer. The lawyer could refuse to continue a case in which the insurer has invested a
substantial amount, unless paid a higher hourly fee. However, such conduct is unlikely in a
market where both the litigation insurer and lawyer are repeat players able to retaliate against
each other for opportunism. See supra note 269.
280. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
281. But see Cooter, supra note 40; Goetz, supra note 41.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 147-94.
283. See supra note 1; see also infra note 316.
284. See infra text accompanying notes 305-09.
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to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, ex-
cept that: (1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litiga-
tion, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter. '285 The Model Code is even more stringent and requires that
the client ultimately be responsible for costs and expenses.286 Jurisdic-
tions using rules modeled after either of these provisions would need
to amend those rules to allow lawyers to pay bonds into court to cover
their clients' potential liability under an English rule and/or to agree
to pay such amounts at the conclusion of litigation. Absent such
changes, lawyers effectively could be precluded from participating in a
market for legal-cost insurance covering English-rule liability.
Close attention also should be given to rules governing attorney-
client transactions, although these rules, at least as drafted by the
ABA,2 87 would not require revision to accommodate insurance
against English-rule liability. As is generally the case for lawyers ne-
gotiating contingent-fee contracts with their clients, lawyers negotiat-
ing legal-cost insurance arrangements should recognize that they are
fiduciaries for their clients, and may not self-deal at the expense of
their clients.2 88 A court reviewing a lawyer-client transaction, includ-
ing a legal-cost insurance contract, would likely examine its overall
fairness.2 89 Although a lawyer would be entitled to some additional
compensation for taking on the additional risks of an English-rule re-
gime, this premium should be reasonable in relation to the risks
involved.2 90
285. See MODEL RuLEs Rule 1.8(E)(1).
286. "[A] lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation, including court costs,
expenses of investigation, expenses of medical examination, and costs of obtaining and present-
ing evidence, provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses." MODEL CODE
DR 5-103(B); see Findlater, supra note 103, at 1667.
287. Model Rule 1.8 provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client ... unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
Model Code DR 5-104 provides in relevant part:
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have dif-
fering interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional
judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the client has consented after
full disclosure.
288. See Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1241 (7th Cir. 1991).
289. Any "fiduciary has the burden of justifying self-dealing transactions." Frankel, supra
note 222, at 824-25.
290. This premium should be relatively modest because the lawyer can expect to recover
reasonable compensation for his services from the opposing party, in addition to the agreed
[Vol. 71:625
LITIGATING ON A CONTINGENCY
Furthermore, attorney-client transactions can involve abuse of
client information. Model Rule 1.8(b) thus provides that a lawyer
shall not "use attorney information relating to representation of a cli-
ent to the disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after
consultation."' 291 A lawyer's use of information about the merits of a
case and the risk of English-rule liability to negotiate a contingent fee
favoring the lawyer could violate this rule if the information and its
significance are not first discussed with the client. Also, the lawyer
should adhere to the admonition of Ethical Consideration 5-7 that,
because he is in a better position to evaluate the cause of action, he
should "enter into a contingent fee arrangement only in those in-
stances where the arrangement will be beneficial to the client." 292
C. Requiring Lawyers to Cooperate with Litigation Insurers
A market for legal-cost insurance should allow a litigant to
choose between insuring with her lawyer through a contingent fee or
with a third-party insurer. Because this choice should be the client's
and not the lawyer's, a lawyer should always allow a client to pay by
the hour, so long as the client has sufficient assets to self-insure or has
insured with a reputable insurer.
Mandatory tie-ins of contingent fees to legal services are im-
proper at least in principle, 293 and rules prohibiting such tie-ins should
be enacted and enforced. Refusal to deal with a customer who
purchases another product from a competitor is prohibited under the
antitrust laws in many circumstances, 294 and such practices likewise
should not be tolerated in the legal profession once alternative suppli-
ers of legal-cost insurance enter the market. Indeed, prior to taking
any case on a contingency, a lawyer should be required to explain to
her client not only the availability of an hourly billing arrangement,
upon share of the judgment from the client, if he wins. Payments and receipts of attorneys' fees
theoretically should balance out. See infra text accompanying note 319.
291. "[A]ttorneys at law, in dealing with their clients, are required to exercise the highest
order of good faith and to disclose to clients all information in their possession" arising out of
the attorney-client relationship. Huston v. Schohr, 146 P.2d 730, 734 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) (prom-
issory note from client to attorney enforceable where attorney had dealt with client in good
faith).
292. MODEL CODE EC 5-7.
293. See MODEL CODE EC 2-20 ("lawyer... may enter into a contingent-fee contract in a
civil case with any client who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that
arrangement"); see also Jay, supra note 11, at 823 (a lawyer should not be able to insist on
representing a client on a contingent-fee basis).




but also the availability of legal-cost insurance and where such insur-
ance can be obtained.
Furthermore, a lawyer should be required to cooperate with
third-party insurers when requested to do so by a client. Although
market incentives also will encourage lawyers to cooperate with litiga-
tion insurers, ethics rules should prohibit a lawyer who is asked by a
client to share information with an insurer from engaging in dilatory
tactics and other conduct aimed at frustrating the insurer. Finally, the
attorney-client privilege should be extended to include within the
zone of confidentiality those insurers designated by the client.2 95
Courts have long recognized that some third parties are needed to
facilitate lawyer-client communications, and their presence usually
will not destroy the privilege. 296 Litigants and their lawyers likewise
should be permitted to communicate in confidence with third parties
needed to finance and insure litigation, and the attorney-client privi-
lege should protect such communications. 297
D. Creation of a Public Contingency Legal Aid Fund
What if private insurers are unwilling to enter the market for
legal-cost insurance? Alternatively, what if so few private insurers
enter the market that these few acquire market power that can be
used to extract monopoly rents from litigants? One answer to both of
these problems, if they arise, would be to establish a public fund,
either through the Legal Services Administration or otherwise, to fi-
nance litigation on more favorable terms. Indeed, the proposal in this
295. Perhaps the most common way the privilege is lost is by showing a privileged document
to a third person or allowing a third person to sit in on a private conversation between an attor-
ney and her client. Once this happens, the privilege is lost and anybody with a proper purpose
can subpoena the document or demand testimony from the lawyer or client on the content of the
document or conversation. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1424
(3d Cir. 1991) ("[W]hen client voluntarily discloses privileged communications to third party the
privilege is waived."); International Honeycomb Corp. v. Transtech Serv. Network, No. 90-
CV3737, 1992 WL 314897, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 1992). Although JPC has access to trial
records and thus does not require access to privileged client information, JPC WHrrE PAPER,
supra note 36, at 3, insurers of cases at the pretrial stage would probably insist on access to at
least some information ordinarily kept within the attorney-client privilege.
296. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961) (privilege covered com-
munications to an accountant needed for a legal matter) ("[I1n contrast to the Tudor times when
the privilege was first recognized, the complexities of modem existence prevent attorneys from
effectively handling clients' affairs without the help of others .... "); see also State v. Rick-
abaugh, 361 N.W.2d 623, 625 (S.D. 1985) (statements made to polygraph test administrator at
attorney's request privileged); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 123-24 (Ct.
App. 1993) (statements made to psychologist at attorney's request privileged).
297. But see Linde Thomson Langworthy Kohn & Van Dyke v. Resolution Trust Corp., 5
F.3d 1508, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (no privilege for statements made by insured to insurer other
than for the purpose of obtaining legal advice).
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Article could be implemented if a government agency were to pay the
fees of plaintiffs' lawyers and then tax judgments and settlements on a
sliding scale of rates based on how much was spent on the lawyers.
In its review of "Alternatives and Supplements to Legal Aid,"
Great Britain's Royal Commission on Legal Services considered a
number of options including a contingency legal aid fund
proposed to be set up under the control of a small number of in-
dependent administrators. Initially, financing would have to be pro-
vided by the Government, though the intention of the proposal is
that the fund should in time become self-supporting .... The ar-
rangement made with prospective plaintiffs would be that in the
event of success the plaintiff would contribute to the fund a propor-
tion of the damages awarded to him, his legal costs being paid, in
accordance with the usual practice, by the losing side. If the plain-
tiff lost his case, the fund would guarantee to pay his costs and those
of the successful defendant. 298
The Royal Commission recognized that such a fund would have
many of the advantages of a contingent-fee system.299 Nonetheless,
the Commission recommended that such a fund not be established, in
part because of fears that the fund would constantly need government
subsidies. Plaintiffs with good chances of success would not use the
fund, whereas fund managers would under political pressures "give
assistance in cases where the plaintiff attracted strong sympathy but
where the prospects of success were not great."300
The first of these problems, self-selection of good risks out of the
insurance pool, will undermine any insurance scheme, public or pri-
vate, if it is practical to self-insure and if insureds have more informa-
tion about risks than do insurers.301 Few litigants, however, have the
tolerance for risk that would make them want to self-insure against
fruitless expenditure on legal fees, much less liability for opposing
counsel's fees. Furthermore, just as a tort lawyer usually knows more
about the value of a particular case than her client, a litigation insurer
should know more than a prospective plaintiff about risks involved in
298. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 177-78.
299. The proposed fund "would avoid some of the disadvantages inherent in a contingency
fee system [because] the lawyer conducting a case supported by the fund would have no personal
interest in the amount of damages awarded but would receive his normal fee whether the case
was won or lost." Id. at 178.
300. Id.
301. Insureds who know that the premium is too high will opt-out while those who know that
the premium is too low will purchase the insurance, and the fund will lose money. However, if
the insurer has equal or superior access to information about the relevant risks, it can adjust
premiums to reflect its own risk assessments, and the insurer's errors (insurance sold for too
little) at least will be offset by errors on the part of its insureds (insurance bought for too much).
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litigation. Although most plaintiffs have superior firsthand knowledge
of relevant facts, the insurer will in most cases have superior knowl-
edge of relevant law, of lawyer time required to prosecute a case, and
of jury awards and settlements for similar cases. The insurer thus has
the informational advantage it needs to price insurance attractively
from the vantage point of purchasers and yet still make money
overall.
The insurer, however, will not make money if its judgment is af-
fected by the second problem identified by the Royal Commission
(funding of cases on account of political expediency rather than eco-
nomics). Just as public pension funds sometimes make investments
for political reasons to the detriment of fund beneficiaries, a practice
harshly criticized by Professor Roberta Romano and others, 30 2 a pub-
lic litigation fund might insure litigation because of its political expedi-
ency rather than its likelihood of success. Insurance sold on such a
basis is almost certain to be a losing proposition for the insurer, which,
as the Royal Commission points out, will constantly need a bailout. 30 3
Thus, if fund managers cannot be subject to the disciplines of the
private marketplace, and isolated from the political pressures of the
public sphere, a public litigation fund is unlikely to be self-sustaining.
In an age of tight government budgets, such a fund is not likely to
survive. It would, however, be possible to initiate a fund capitalized
with public money, perhaps in the form of a loan, and then to require
the fund to sustain itself after a relatively brief adjustment period.
Once the public money is appropriated, fund managers, if isolated
from external influence and given proper incentive compensation,
should be motivated by market forces rather than politics.
Furthermore, -public capitalization of a fund might not be neces-
sary-this Article has described many reasons why private parties
might be lower cost providers of legal-cost insurance than lawyers
working on a contingency. If so, private capital should move in to fill
302. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsid-
ered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 801-15 (1993) (criticizing "social investments" made by public
pension funds in housing, local industries, and venture capital).
If a particular small business or residential project is unable to attract financing from
the private sector, it is far more probable that the difficulty is due to the market's
efficiently pricing the risk at a cost greater than the project developers are willing to
pay, rather than the result of a capital market failure.
Id. at 813. The same could be said of a lawsuit that a public litigation fund is willing to fund on
more favorable terms than those offered by a contingent-fee lawyer or a private-litigation in-
surer. As Professor Romano points out, the pressure on a public fund to make such politically
motivated investments can be overwhelming. Id. at 801-07.
303. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 178.
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this need once restrictions on champerty are lifted and lawyers are
required to cooperate with nonlawyer litigation insurers.
VI. THE ENGLISH RULE IN AN EFFICIENT MARKET FOR
CHAMPERTY
Although the usual "American Rule" is that each party to a law-
suit shall bear its own attorneys' fees, there are many exceptions.
Some federal statutes award attorneys' fees to successful plaintiffs.
304
Other statutes allow successful plaintiffs or defendants to recover at-
torneys' fees.30 5 Some state statutes award attorneys' fees to success-
ful plaintiffs, but not to defendants, unless a plaintiff's claim is
frivolous.306 Also, winning parties' attorneys' fees may be allowed
against unsuccessful defendants as punitive damages.307 Furthermore,
a lawyer who signs a frivolous or unsubstantiated pleading can be
sanctioned and required to pay opposing counsel's attorneys' fees
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 30 8 Finally, at-
304. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994). While the
amount of damages a plaintiff recovers may be relevant to the amount awarded under the Fees
Act, there is no "indication that Congress intended to adopt a strict rule that attorney's fees
under § 1988 be proportionate to damages recovered ...." City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S.
561, 581 (1986) ($245,456.25 in attorney's fees awarded where respondents won $33,350 in dam-
ages). Other federal statutes in which attorney's fees are allowed for successful plaintiffs, but not
defendants, include actions brought under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3)
(1994), federal minimum wage laws, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994), and antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. §
15(a) (1994). See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970) (express statutory
authorization not needed to award attorney's fees to shareholders suing for misleading proxy
statement under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act). Under some circumstances, a public
interest organization rather than an individual plaintiff can be the beneficiary of a fee-shifting
statute. See Jordan v. United States Dep't of Just., 691 F.2d 514, 516-17 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (fee
awarded to a law school clinic).
The Supreme Court has restricted district courts' discretion to adjust court-awarded fees
upward based on risk. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 483 U.S. 711, 730
(1987); see also Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable"?, 126
U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1978); John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90
YALE L.J. 473 (1981).
305. A court may, at its discretion, award attorney's fees to any prevailing party in federal
actions concerning patents, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1994) (in exceptional cases) and copyrights, 17
U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
306. See Oregon Unlawful Trade Practices Act, OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(3) (1993).
307. See Lenz v. CNA Assurance Co., 630 A.2d 1082, 1082-83 (Conn. 1993) (employee
awarded punitive damages against insurance company for unjustified reduction of state worker's
compensation benefits); St. Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 568 A.2d 35, 37,43
(Md. 1990) (in determining award of punitive damages in defamation action by employee against
former employer, a jury may consider award of attorney's fees); Curry v. Big Bears Store Co.,
142 N.E.2d 684, 685 (Ohio 1956) ("Where punitive damages are allowed it is proper for the jury
to allow a reasonable attorney fee.").
308. See Sussman v. Salem, Saxon, & Nielsen, 152 F.R.D. 648, 651 (M.D. Fla. 1994) ("Mone-
tary sanctions [under Rule 11] are normally limited to reasonable attorney's fees and ex-
penses."); Kunstler, Nakell, Pitts, & Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 914 F.2d 505, 516 (4th
Cir. 1990) ("[A] complaint containing allegations unsupported by any information obtained
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torneys' fees of the winning party in shareholder derivative suits may
be charged to the loser.309 Nonetheless, proponents of the English
rule believe that these selective fee-shifting provisions are sporadically
enforced and do not go far enough.310
An advantage of the English rule is that it imposes more of the
costs of litigation on the party who may be in the best position to
avoid those costs: the plaintiff who brings a lawsuit with a poor chance
of winning or the defendant who defends a suit that she should have
settled. The American rule thus may encourage frivolous claims and
defenses. 311 Critics of the American rule also argue that for successful
plaintiffs the rule is simply unfair because they are not made whole. 312
A disadvantage of the English rule, however, is that it deprives
risk-averse and impecunious litigants of access to the courts. If they
lose, such litigants not only must pay their own lawyers, but also must
pay their opponents' lawyers. Settlement discussions thus could be
influenced by litigants' tolerance for risk as much as by the merits of
their respective claims. A large corporate defendant, for example,
might have a decided advantage over an individual middle-income
plaintiff. Furthermore, making a losing party pay the winner's legal
expenses could discourage risk-averse and impecunious plaintiffs from
litigating at all; far from screening claims based on their merit, the rule
would screen claims based on plaintiffs' ability to pay their opponents'
lawyers. Finally, it is by no means certain that an English rule would
reduce litigiousness. 313 Indeed, an English rule in some circumstances
prior to filing, or allegations based on information which minimal factual inquiry would disprove,
will subject the author to sanctions.").
309. Revised Model Business Corporation Act §7.46 (Supp. 1995) provides that "[o]n termi-
nation of the derivative proceeding, the court may... order the corporation to pay the plaintiff's
reasonable expenses" or "order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses" if the
"proceeding was commenced without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose."; see also
Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act §1004 (1995) (court may award reasonable expenses
to plaintiff in a derivative action).
310. See supra notes 1, 23 and accompanying text.
311. See Shavell, supra note 216, at 59-60, 68-69. Richard Posner observes that the English
rule enhances penalties for losing and thus may discourage litigation. Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 428
(1973).
312. Judge Posner has argued that the English rule would help rather than harm poor people,
as it would other litigants, "who [have] a better than 50 percent chance of prevailing." Id. at 439.
A similar argument appears in Ehrenzweig, supra note 23, at 792 (relating that when the author
first came to the United States, he sought to sue a mover who took his belongings, but was
surprised to learn that he would have to pay his own attorneys' fees).
313. "[I]t is essential to consider the impact of a possible fee shift on both sides' settlement
incentives, which can make predictions complex." Rowe, Statement, supra note 23, at 6. Fur-
thermore, the American rule has the advantage of saving transaction costs incurred when courts
rule on fee award amounts. Id. at 7. Professor Rowe characterizes the English rule as an imposi-
tion of "strict rather than fault liability" on litigants. "[W]hether or not we think you were
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could increase the amount of litigation on the part of plaintiffs with
strong claims who "can hold out for more. ' 314 Nonetheless, Congress
has considered legislation requiring that attorneys' fees be awarded to
prevailing parties in diversity suits and suits over products liability.
315
Some state legislatures also have experimented with the English
rule.
3 1 6
If an English rule is adopted, a market for legal-cost insurance
would avert many of the distributive injustices of the rule, including
the rule's inherent bias toward well-to-do litigants, by allowing plain-
tiffs to spread the risk of losing. The market would allow risk-averse
parties to insure against not only the risk of paying their own lawyers
for fruitless litigation, but also the risk of being held responsible for a
winner's litigation expenses. Litigation insurers, writing policies on
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of lawsuits, could diversify away risk
that might have a powerful deterrent effect on individual litigants.
Indeed, both plaintiffs and defendants in tort litigation could be
required to post bonds at the outset of litigation to reimburse the suc-
cessful party's expenses in much the same manner as plaintiffs in cor-
porate derivative litigation are often required to do.317 Litigation
insurers would post the bond and charge the parties therefor in ac-
cordance with their likelihood of success on the merits.318 Insurance
premiums could be charged as either fixed dollar amounts or more
likely as fixed percentages of judgments if litigation is successful.
How much would such insurance cost under an English rule?
Surprisingly, insurance against payment of opposing counsel's fees
might not cost much. A high surcharge would not be justified because
unreasonable about insisting on your right to trial, if you lose you suffer not only the judgment
on the merits against you but must pay what it cost both sides to get the verdict." Id. at 5.
Furthermore, Rowe observes that "[t]he loser-pays rule works an especially harsh form of strict
liability when costs are likely to be highest and the loser's conduct most reasonable-in closely
contested cases." Id.
314. Id. at 7.
315. See supra note 1.
316. Alaska has a modified version of the English rule. See ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 82 (unsuc-
cessful plaintiffs must pay twenty to thirty percent of the actual fees "necessarily incurred" by
defendants). From 1980 to 1985, Florida had an English rule for medical malpractice lawsuits,
but the rule was repealed at the urging of doctors who found that they were often unable to
recover from unsuccessful plaintiffs. Rowe, Statement, supra note 23, at 8. Texas has enacted
loser-pays statutes for certain types of lawsuits. Maggs & Weiss, supra note 23, at 1921.
317. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney 1986); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (1949) (state security for expenses statutes applied); Note, Security for
Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS.
50, 50-53 (1968) (discussing effects of New York's statute governing derivative litigation).
318. In the absence of legal-cost insurance, such bond posting requirements can deter litiga-
tion. See Findlater, supra note 103, at 1670.
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insurers, whether contingent-fee lawyers or private insurers, also
would recover higher amounts if litigation under an English-style fee-
shifting rule were successful (legal fees recovered from defendants
would be added to the percentage of damages premium paid by suc-
cessful plaintiffs). It is true that some judgments for costs might not
be recoverable because defendants cannot or will not pay,319 but these
defendants probably will not pay judgments either, and thus are un-
likely targets for lawsuits in the first place. Generally, higher recov-
eries for winning parties under an English rule should make up for
higher payments when cases are lost. In a competitive market, the
premium charged for legal-cost insurance under an English rule thus
should not be much higher than the premium charged under an Amer-
ican rule.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the relationship between a market for
legal-cost insurance and recent proposals concerning both the English
rule and contingent fees. What legal and economic conditions, if any,
would induce lawyer and nonlawyer insurers to agree, in exchange for
a percentage of a judgment, to share the risks of litigation? If private
parties, for whatever reason, cannot or will not offer such insurance,
should public agencies do so instead?
Regardless of the other advantages and disadvantages of the Eng-
lish rule, if legal-cost insurance were available at competitive rates, it
would be far more equitable to impose attorneys' fees on losing par-
ties because access to the courts would not be contingent on litigants'
aversion to risk. Furthermore, contingent fees might be kept at rea-
sonable levels by a competitive market for legal-cost insurance. Alter-
natively, if lawyers are the only efficient providers of legal-cost
insurance and are unwilling to insure their clients against English-rule
liability in addition to their own fees at a fair price, adoption of an
English loser-pays rule may unacceptably restrict access to the courts.
Furthermore, with or without an English rule, some regulation of con-
tingent fees may be desirable to restrict lawyers' potential abuse of
their market power.
Professional conduct rules that accommodate contingent fees, to-
gether with lingering prohibitions on champerty by nonlawyers, give
plaintiffs' lawyers a virtual monopoly on champerty of litigation. The
319. One reason Florida doctors urged repeal of that state's English rule was that many
unsuccessful plaintiffs could not or would not pay. See Rowe, Statement, supra note 23, at 8.
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Brickman Proposal suggests a check on abuse of this market power. It
would, however, be useful to consider the alternative of opening the
market for champerty to nonlawyer participants (private litigation in-
surers, a public litigation insurance fund, or both). A free market for
champerty may make legal-cost insurance available to litigants on
competitive terms and at the same time allow adoption of an English-
style fee-shifting rule without a disparate impact on litigants based on
their wealth and aversion to risk.
